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CITIZENSHIP HAS ITS PRIVILEGES
The Court Resurrects A Civil War-Era Ideal
The New York Times
Sunday, May 23, 1999
Linda Greenhouse
IN constitutional law, as in geology,
things can look perfectly stable on the
surface -- until the tectonic plates shift
underneath.
As the Supreme Court term heads into
its final weeks, the question is whether
such a shift may be underway. In its
decision last week striking down
California's reduced welfare benefits for
newcomers to the state, the Court relied
on a portion of the 14th Amendment that
forbids states to restrict the "privileges or
immunities" of American citizens.
This is the long-neglected privileges-
or-immunities clause, the sudden
resurrection of which, by a broad 7-to-2
majority, was certainly one of the most
surprising and possibly one of the most
consequential constitutional developments
in years.
The 14th Amendment, adopted in
1868 to ratify the outcome of the Civil
War, says in its first paragraph, "No state
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." There is
historical evidence that the amendment's
drafters regarded the privileges-or-
immunities clause as more important than
the much-invoked guarantees of due
process and equal protection that it
precedes in the text.
But the clause was sent into early
eclipse by an 1873 Supreme Court
decision known as the Slaughter-House
cases, which held that the clause protected
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only the rights of national citizenship and
placed no new obligations on the states.
So by turning back to this long-bunied
language, the Court was taking at least a
tentative step on a new path of
constitutional analysis. While the ultimate
destination is uncertain, it appeals to both
conservatives, who see the clause as a new
source for protection for property and
economic rights, and for weary liberals,
who see it as a means for protecting
individual rights without having to fight
endless battles over the meaning of due
process.
And indeed, Justices across the
ideological spectrum signed their names to
this opinion, from John Paul Stevens, its
author and arguably the Court's most
liberal member, to Antonin Scalia, one of
the most conservative.
While Justice Clarence Thomas
dissented, disagreeing that welfare was
one of the historically protected privileges,
he made clear his enthusiasm for
reconsidering the privileges-or-
immunitiesclause in an "appropriate case."
That left Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist oddly isolated in his complaint
that "the Court today breathes new life
into the previously dormant privileges or
immunities clause," an observation that
the majority did not rebut.
The Justices who came together in the
California welfare case, Saenz v. Roe, did
not necessarily do so for the same
reasons, or with the same expectations of
where this new opening might lead. The
privileges-or-immunities clause has been
invisible for so long that there are few
recognizable signposts, and there were no
concurring opinions by which individual
members of the majority might have
elaborated on the analysis.
But at the least, to carry the geological
analogy a step further, the opinion
undoubtedly achieved a release of
doctrinal tension much as an earthquake
relieves pressure that builds up under the
Earth's crust.
The two-tiered welfare program
challenged in this case was quite clearly
unconstitutional under the Court's most
directly relevant precedent, a 1969
decision called Shapiro v. Thompson that
invoked a constitutional "right to travel"
to bar states from denying welfare
benefits during a newcomer's first year of
residency.
Yet there was probably no member of
the current Court completely at ease with
the analytic method that produced
Shapiro v. Thompson. That decision
represented a kind of high-water mark of
the Warren Court's open-ended approach
to constitutional analysis -- so much so
that Chief Justice Earl Warren himself
dissented from Justice William J.
Brennan's majority opinion, which
candidly conceded that the right to travel
was not anchored to any particular place
in the Constitution.
"We have no occasion to ascribe the
source of this right to travel interstate to a
particular constitutional provision,"
Justice Brennan wrote. It goes without
saying that there are no Warren Court-
style liberals on the Court today. Briefs
from a group of states and other
interested parties in the current case urged
the Justices simply to overrule the 1969
precedent.
Instead, in Justice Stevens's practiced
hands, the right to travel did not disappear
but morphed into a right of national
citizenship that each state is obliged to
honor and that, more to the point, has a
solid foundation in the Constitution's text.
For the Court's moderate justices, the
privileges-or-immunities clause offers a
comfort zone that permits them to defend
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individual rights while shedding the
baggage of liberal methodology.
For conservatives, particularly those
with libertarian leanings like Justice
Thomas, the appeal of the clause is even
clearer. There is no dispute that, as a
matter of history, the privileges the
amendment's drafters sought to protect
included the right to earn a living, enter
into contracts and acquire and maintain
property free of government interference
- all aspects of the natural law philosophy
that inspired the signers of the
Declaration of Independence.
THE privileges-or-immunities clause
should be used to restore "the
fundamental connection between the
Constitution and its natural law
foundations," Roger Pilon, director of
constitutional studies for the Cato
Institute, a libertarian policy group here,
wrote in a law review article several
months ago.
One result would be, Mr. Pilon argues,
to raise the level of protection for
economic rights, like unrestricted land use,
which receive only minimal scrutiny under
current constitutional analysis, to the level
of protection given to individual rights
that under the current approach are
deemed "fundamental."
In any event, it is clear that the
Justices in a sense are simply catching up
with a lively discussion that has been
going on for some time among legal
academics and constitutional historians. A
broad, although by no means universal,
consensus has emerged that the Slaughter-
House decision of 1873 was based on a
mistaken understanding of the intent of
the drafters.
Now that the Court has spoken,
however tentatively, that conversation will
expand to a wider audience. Arguments
based on privileges or immunities will be
developed in law review articles and
presented to lower court judges, who in
turn will write opinions that will provide
more raw material for the Court, if the
Justices want to use it to move further
down the new path.
Just as the Court does not act in
isolation from the rest of the legal system,
cases on its docket do not exist in
isolation from one another. Between now
and the end of next month, the Justices
will announce decisions in three cases that
challenge the power of the Federal
Government with respect to the states.
It would be surprising if the Court
does not continue on its recent course of
shifting power away from Congress, a
result the states are actively seeking. But
new power may come with a price if, as
California learned on Monday, the Court
at the same time is placing new
obligations on the states to safeguard the
rights of all their citizens.
Copyright ©1999 The New York Times
Company
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TRAVELING BACK IN TIME
Privileges and Immunities Clause Unearthed to Strike Down State
Welfare Law
Legal Times
Monday, July 12,1999
Thomas E. Baker
The Supreme Court has amended the
14th Amendment. In Saenz v. Roe, 119 S.
Ct. 1518 (1999), a seven-member majority
revived the privileges and immunities
clause after 130 years of judicial
desuetude.
Ratified in 1868, the 14th Amendment
is the most significant of all the
amendments for protecting civil rights and
liberties. The constitutional couplets "due
process" and "equal protection" have
generated volumes of annotations limning
state action, procedural due process,
substantive due process, fundamental
rights, incorporation of the Bill of Rights,
suspect classifications, privacy, etc.
But the third clause was virtually read
out of the 14th Amendment in the
Slaughter-House Cases (1873), decided by
a 5-4 vote just five years after ratification.
Since then, the privileges and immunities
clause was used to invalidate state
legislation only one time, in 1935, and
even that decision was overruled five years
later.
So it was a "Constitution-bites-state"
kind of headline when the Court invoked
the privileges and immunities clause in
Saenz to strike down a California welfare
code section requiring that families
moving from a state with lower benefits
would continue to receive the same
amount of benefits provided by their
former state for their first year in
California.
California first enacted the new-
resident differential in 1992. Congress
authorized such differentials by states as
part of a package of reforms in 1996
intended to "end welfare as we know it."
The pseudonymous plaintiffs, Brenda
Roe and Anna Doe, sued the California
Department of Social Services,
department Director Rita Saenz, and other
state officials, alleging that the new-
resident differential burdened their
constitutional right to travel.
The leading prior precedent was
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), which struck down state laws that
required one year of residency to qualify
for welfare, but that opinion conflated the
right to travel with the equal protection
clause. It is important to emphasize,
however, that the Saenz majority did not
simply rely on Shapiro.
Instead, the majority revisited the
Slaughter-House Cases and other
precedents to demarcate three distinct
understandings of the right to travel: the
right to go from place to place; the right
to be treated as a welcomed visitor; and
the right to become an equal, permanent
resident. Saenz involved the third
understanding: "the right of the newly
arrived citizen to the same privileges and
immunities enjoyed by other citizens of
the same State." The Court found that
this right of federal citizenship is
guaranteed and protected by the privileges
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and immunities clause in the 14th
Amendment and may not be burdened by
the states.
Applying heightened scrutiny, the
majority concluded that the discriminatory
classification exacted a penalty on new
residents that was not justified by the
state's interest to save money or Congress'
desire to avoid a "race to the bottom" in
which states would lower benefits to avoid
becoming "welfare magnets." One fact
was particularly significant: an
evenhanded, across-the- board reduction
of about 72 cents per month for every
recipient would have saved California the
same amount of money as the new-
resident differential. This was telling, since
the impact could be dramatic for families
living at the margin who moved from one
of the lowest-paying states, like
Mississippi ($144 per month), to
California ($673 per month), one of the
most generous jurisdictions.
Justice John Paul Stevens' majority
opinion was joined by the Court's four
former law professors--Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
and Stephen Breyer--as well as Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor and David Souter.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separate
dissents and joined each other's opinion.
Rehnquist insisted that the plaintiffs
were no longer traveling when they
became citizens of California, subject to
state laws, including reasonable welfare
regulations. His dissent reads like a poster
for the recent movie "The Mummy," with
theatrical references to the majority's
efforts to "breathe new life into" and
"unearth from its tomb" the privileges
and immunities clause--characterizations
the majority did not bother to rebut.
Thomas harkened back to the
intentions of the framers of the 14th
Amendment. He admitted that he was
dissatisfied with the case law interpreting
the due process and equal protection
clauses and stated that he would be "open
to reevaluating" the privileges and
immunities clause "in an appropriate
case." But he worried that the Saenz
majority and future majorities would
simply invent rights they liked, without
doing the heavy lifting of historical
analysis. Thomas surmised that the
framers of the clause probably had in
mind fundamental natural rights rooted in
history and common law, but he was
certain that they were not thinking about
public entitlements like welfare.
What should we make of the
remarkable fact that all nine justices
expressed at least some enthusiasm for
reviving the privileges and immunities
clause after 130 years? Is this holding a
harbinger of new substantive rights? What
sort of state laws might we expect to be
challenged?
Constitutional Adjustment
Calls for reversing the Slaughter-
House Cases have come from both sides
of the ideological spectrum. Professors
have always presumed that the decision
was wrong, although there has been little
academic consensus about just what is a
privilege and immunity of federal
citizenship. Indeed, the one thing that
scholars seem to agree on is that the
framers of the 14th Amendment expected
the privileges and immunities clause to be
far more significant than either the due
process clause or the equal protection
clause. Maybe now it will be.
Challenges likely will be brought
against virtually all state residency
requirements for programs and benefits.
This will not mean that a person can drive
along the interstate highways collecting
welfare checks at every state welcome
center. But if the Court requires
heightened scrutiny, the states will be hard
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pressed to justify any requirement beyond
a simple determination that the person is
in fact a bona fide resident. As a practical
matter, policing eligibility for state
benefits and licensing commercial
activities will be harder.
We should expect that Saenz will lead
to a fundamental reconceptualization of
the 14th Amendment. Both the equal
protection/fundamental rights cases and
the due process/incorporation of the Bill
of Rights cases would make much more
sense as annotations of the privileges and
immunities clause. Even the dissenters
opined that this area of constitutional law
lacks coherency and needs rethinking.
For advocates on the left, Saenz may
help them strengthen and broaden
nontextual rights. Most important, the
right to privacy could be derived more
directly from the privileges and
immunities clause than from elliptical
discursives about penumbras and
unconvincing accounts of the history and
tradition of ordered liberty. Perhaps the
justices will find a synergy between the
clause and the Ninth Amendment's
textual expectation of rights beyond the
four corners of the Constitution.
Libertarians will find in the privileges
and immunities clause what Scalia once
mocked as "that Thoreauvian you-may-
do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does- not-
injure-someone-else' beau ideal." Barnes
v. Glen Theatre Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991)(Scalia, J., concurring). The clause
could be employed to protect the core
value of personal autonomy. If we
imagine what Justice William Brennan
might have done with this clause in
support of human dignity, we can begin to
appreciate its potential expansiveness.
On the right, contemporary devotees
of John Locke, ever solicitous of property
rights, may also find Saenz useful. We can
expect institutional litigators to invoke this
holding to advocate economic liberty.
Heightened scrutiny under the privileges
and immunities clause may cut across all
sorts of economic regulation on practicing
an occupation and acquiring private
property. It was a government-sponsored
monopoly, after all, that was at issue in the
Slaughter-House Cases.
We can expect challenges to
occupational licensing laws that
discriminate against outsiders; the
interstate barriers to practicing law may be
vulnerable. It is not a sure bet that states
still will be allowed to extract out-of-state
tuition premiums at state universities. The
conservative Institute for Justice, which
filed an amicus brief in Saenz, is already
preparing court challenges against cabaret
licensing in New York City and newsstand
regulations in Baltimore. The right to
contract of the Lochner era may be
beneath the bandages of this mummy.
Whatever one thinks of judicial
activism that reads rights into the
Constitution, judicial activism that reads
rights out of the Constitution is far worse.
What is more remarkable than the
invalidation of a state law under the
privileges and immunities clause is that for
130 years the Supreme Court ignored one
of the great clauses in the 14th
Amendment. We will have to wait and see
if the justices make up for lost time.
Thomas E. Baker holds the James
Madison Chair in constitutional law and
serves as the director of the Constitutional
Law Center at Drake University Law
School, Des Moines, Iowa.
Copyright (1999 American Lawyer
Newspapers Group Inc.
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THE SUPREME COURT EXHUMES THE 14TH AMENDMENT'S
'PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES' CLAUSE
Legal Times
Monday, May 24,1999
Clint Bolick
When I was studying for the bar
examination, the constitutional law
instructor told the class there was only
one thing we needed to know about the
14th Amendment's "privileges or
immunities" clause: It was never the right
answer to a bar exam question.
Last Monday, the bar exam suddenly got
tougher.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Saenz v. Roe struck down a
California law that limited welfare benefits
for new residents. But in the process, the
Court did something remarkable-
"unearthing from its tomb," as dissenting
Chief Justice William Rehnquist put it, the
privileges or immunities clause that was
buried in its infancy 126 years ago. The
Saenz decision opens the door to fill a
previously empty constitutional vessel--
and to advance the cause of economic
liberty.
That the privileges or immunities
clause has lain dormant for so long is
astounding. Among the 14th
Amendment's trilogy of protections, the
edict that "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United
States" appears first. The clause also
provides the amendment's only
substantive, rather than procedural,
restraint on government power. Yet as
Justice Clarence Thomas observed in his
Saenz dissent, "unlike the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses,
which have assumed near-talismanic status
in modem constitutional law, the Court all
but read the Privileges or Immunities
Clause out of the Constitution in the
Slaughter-House Cases" in 1873.
That decision betrayed the high hopes
of the amendment's framers, who
intended the clause to remedy grievous
civil rights violations and provide a
durable bulwark for freedom. Following
the Civil War, Southern states enacted
"black codes," designed to deprive former
slaves of vital liberties such as freedom of
contract, property ownership, and the
right to pursue a chosen trade or
profession.
Just five years after the adoption of
the 14th Amendment in 1868, the clause
was eviscerated. By a 5-4 vote, rare in
those days, the Court upheld a Louisiana
law that created a slaughterhouse
monopoly in New Orleans and drove
butchers out of business. The majority
opinion by Justice Samuel Miller ruled
that the clause protected against state
infringement only those rights that derive
from national citizenship, such as habeas
corpus and the right of access to navigable
waters. The economic rights asserted by
the butchers were indeed "privileges or
immunities," the majority conceded, but
only insofar as states might elect to
protect them.
The dissenters justifiably were
appalled. As construed by the majority,
Justice Stephen Field declared, the clause
"was a vain and idle enactment, which
accomplished nothing." By refusing to
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acknowledge any significant restraint on
state police power, Field lamented, "the
right of free labor, one of the most sacred
and imprescriptible rights of man, is
violated." Another dissenter, Justice Noah
Swayne, voiced hope that the
consequences of the decision would
"prove less serious and far-reaching than
the minority fear they will be."
Unfortunately, Slaughter-House
caused all manner of mischief. When
Adolph Plessy challenged a Jim Crow law
requiring segregated railway cars in Plessy
v. Ferguson (1896), Slaughter-House
deprived him of his strongest argument:
freedom of contract. Forced to rely on the
equal protection clause, Plessy lost 8-1,
and "separate but equal" would receive
judicial sanction for 58 years.
Meanwhile, essential economic
liberties were relegated to carte blanche
"rational basis" review. With the privileges
or immunities clause buried, the Bill of
Rights was selectively and torturously
applied to the states through the due
process clause.
Calls for reversing Slaughter-House
have spanned the ideological spectrum.
For instance, Professor Michael Kent
Curtis of the Wake Forest University
School of Law and the American Civil
Liberties Union's Nadine Strossen believe
correctly that the privileges or immunities
clause provides a far more secure
foundation for the Bill of Rights than the
due process clause.
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AT STAKE
My own organization, the Institute for
Justice, is perhaps the only group whose
core mission includes reviving the
privileges or immunities clause. In
numerous cases, we have represented
start-up entrepreneurs in constitutional
challenges to occupational licensing laws,
transportation monopolies, and other
regulatory barriers. We have won several
cases under the equal protection and due
process clauses, but the legal terrain is
treacherous for economic liberty so long
as Slaughter-House stands.
The Court's Saenz decision
unquestionably changes the equation,
though it was an odd case to embark upon
a jurisprudential journey to revive the
privileges or immunities clause.
California's two-tiered welfare
payment regime, which limited new
residents during their first year to the level
of benefits received in their former states,
faced a tough challenge under past
precedents. In Shapiro v. Thompson
(1969), for instance, the Court invalidated
durational residency requirements for
welfare benefits as a violation of the "right
to travel."
As Justice John Paul Stevens
acknowledged in his majority opinion in
Saenz, the right to travel "is not found in
the text of the Constitution" yet is "firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence." In
Shapiro, the Court derived the right to
travel from the equal protection
guarantee. Thirteen years later in Zobel v.
Williams, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
found the right to travel in Article IV,
Section 2, which provides that the
"Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States."
Either of those constitutional bases
could have sufficed to invalidate the
California welfare law. Nonetheless, the
Saenz Court reached out to the privileges
or immunities clause to find "an
additional source of protection" for the
right to travel. Citing only Slaughter-
House, the Court stated that "it has always
been common ground that this Clause
protects . . . the right to travel." While the
right to travel has been long established,
Saenz is unique and remarkable because it
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relied on the privileges or immunities
clause to strike down state legislation.
In his dissent, Thomas criticized the
majority for failing to address the
historical underpinnings of the privileges
or immunities clause. Exploring the
common law and Reconstruction-era
origins of the privileges or immunities
guarantee, he concluded that the term was
meant to encompass fundamental natural
rights, but not public benefits.
While noting that he would "be open
to reevaluating its meaning in an
appropriate case," Thomas warned that
such an inquiry, if bereft of historical
analysis, could raise "the specter that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause will
become another convenient tool for
inventing new rights."
Still, the fear of damaged cargo should
not cause us to abandon the voyage to
revive the privileges or immunities clause.
Judicial activism that creates rights that do
not exist in the Constitution is bad, but
judicial activism that reads rights out of
the Constitution is even worse. The
drafters of the 14th Amendment plainly
intended to limit oppressive state action
and protect fundamental rights. For more
than 130 years, particularly in the context
of property rights and economic liberty,
that promise has largely gone unfulfilled.
Properly construed, the privileges or
immunities clause would require states to
justify restraints on economic liberty by
demonstrating that they are substantially
related to a legitimate governmental
objective. As the dissenters in Slaughter-
House recognized, regulations that serve
no purpose other than economic
protectionism would be swept aside, while
regulations reasonably designed to protect
public health and safety would survive
scrutiny.
The Saenz Court has issued an
invitation to revisit a long-buried doctrine.
While the civil rights struggles of the 20th
century have focused on giving tangible
meaning to the due process and equal
protection clauses, it is time now to make
good on the first and most basic promise
of the 14th Amendment: the guarantee
that states shall not abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens.
Clint Bolick is litigation director at the
Institute for Justice in Washington, D.C.
His most recent book is Transformation:
The Promise and Politics of
Empowerment (ICS Press, 1999).
Copyright C 1999 American Lawyer
Newspapers Group Inc.
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VOTING DISTRICTS GET SOME LEEWAY
Supreme Court Overturns Ruling in Racial Gerrymander Case
Austin American-Statesman
Tuesday, May 18, 1999
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON - Revisiting a
much-disputed North Carolina
congressional district Monday, the
Supreme Court ruled with surprising
unanimity that even a conscious
concentration of black voters did not
automatically make a district
unconstitutional as long as the state's
primary motivation in drawing the district
might have been political rather than
racial.
The court overturned a judgment won
last year by a group of white voters who
challenged the latest version of North
Carolina's 12th Congressional District as
an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
The case now will go back to a special
three-judge federal district court in
Raleigh with instructions to take account
of the state's evidence that it wanted to
create a district of loyal Democrats, many
of whom happened to be black.
The plaintiffs were allied with the
white voters whose challenge to an earlier
and more heavily black version of the
same district led in 1993 to the Supreme
Court's Shaw vs. Reno decision, which
opened the door to strict and -- until now
-- invariably fatal judicial scrutiny of
districts drawn as part of an effort to
enhance black political representation.
justice Clarence Thomas' decision for
the court Monday in no way disavowed
Shaw vs. Reno or the four cases that
followed it, striking down majority black
districts in Georgia and Texas as well as in
North Carolina. Rather, Thomas said,
those cases had limits: Plaintiffs retain the
burden of proving that race was,
impermissibly, "the predominant factor"
in drawing district lines, and lower courts
are not free to ignore, as this one did,
evidence of other permissible motivations.
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"A jurisdiction may engage in
constitutional political gerrymandering,
even if it so happens that the most loyal
Democrats happen to be black Democrats
and even if the state were conscious of
that fact," Thomas said, adding,
"Evidence that blacks constitute even a
supermajority mi one congressional district
while amounting to less than a plurality in
a neighboring district will not, by itself,
suffice to prove that a jurisdiction was
motivated by race in drawing its district
lines when the evidence also shows a high
correlation between race and party
preference."
The question of motivation is a fact to
be proved at trial, he said, not a
conclusion to be assumed by a court at
the summary judgment stage, as happened
in this case. Thomas emphasized that the
court was taking no position on the
ultimate question of the 12th District's
constitutionality. He said there was
evidence of both a political motive and a
racial motive for the district, which is now
47 percent black.
Although the 9-0 decision was in that
sense inconclusive, its importance on the
eve of the next national round of
redistricting could reach considerably
beyond the fate of this particular district, a
thin, 90-mile-long squiggle that links
centers of black population in west-central
North Carolina.
Monday's decision, Hunt vs.
Cromartie, was essentially a set of
instructions to the lower court judges who
will be hearing similar challenges after the
2000 census.
Thomas appeared to go out of his way
to make clear that simple consciousness of
race among district line-drawers is not, by
itself, enough to invalidate a district.
Lower court judges misunderstand the
Supreme Court's recent precedents if they
think the court has instructed them to
root out any use of race, Thomas said.
While all nine justices agreed with the
decision, the four who consistently have
dissented from the recent redistricting
cases did not sign Thomas' opinion,
instead filing a separate opinion to
emphasize what they said was the
weakness of the evidence for a racial
gerrymander in this case. Justice John Paul
Stevens wrote the separate opinion, which
Justices David Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer also signed.
The practical effect of the ruling
Monday may be to give states "very
significant breathing room" as they
approach the next round of redistricting,
Walter Dellinger, who argued the case for
North Carolina, said Monday. Dellinger,
the former acting solicitor general,
handled the case as a private citizen and
North Carolina resident.
Since there tends to be a strong
correlation between race and voting
patterns in many areas, the court's
approach may well permit the incumbent
politicians who draw district lines to
achieve two goals at once: concentrate
predictable Democratic and Republican
voters in separate districts while at the
same time ensuring continued black
representation from certain areas.
Copyright © 1999 The Austin American-
Statesman
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MOTIVE COUNTS
Clarence Thomas'Redistricting Guide
The Connecticut Law Tribune
Monday, May 24,1999
Stuart Taylor Jr.
While racial gerrymandering of
election districts is unconstitutional, race-
conscious political gerrymandering is not.
That is the sensible message of the
Supreme Court's May 17 decision holding
unanimously that the boundaries of a
North Carolina congressional district had
not been proven unconstitutional -- not
yet, at least -- and sending the case back to
a lower court for further proceedings.
Justice Clarence Thomas' brief
opinion (joined by four other justices) in
the case of Hunt v. Cromartie may help
steer the Court's history of conflicted and
confusing jurisprudence in this area
toward a coherent resting place.
The decision at least gives states better
guidance on how to get through the
decennial redistricting after next year's
census without running afoul of the
courts. And it represents the clearest
acknowledgment so far by the Court's
conservatives that the redistricting process
cannot be made completely colorblind,
because the politicians who draw the lines
cannot help but be aware of racial voting
patterns.
In past decisions, Thomas and the
four other conservative justices have
struck down the blatant racial
gerrymandering that the Justice
Department for years pressured states to
adopt in order to create as many majority-
black and majority-Hispanic districts as
possible.
Now these five justices have joined
their four more-liberal colleagues in
specifying that the Court will allow states
to engage in political gerrymandering even
when the results include heavily black or
Hispanic districts.
The specific issue before the justices
was whether a three-judge lower court in
Raleigh had been correct in awarding
summary judgment, without having heard
detailed evidence on the issue of motive,
to white voter- plaintiffs who challenged
as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander
the current version of North Carolina's
much-litigated 12th Congressional
District. That district is now 47 percent
black.
The Court was unanimous in
reversing the lower court and sending the
case back, asking the lower court to take
more evidence on whether the legislature's
primary motive had been to create a
strong Democratic district (surrounded by
Republican districts), as the state claimed,
or to concentrate black voting strength, as
the white plaintiffs argued.
Examining Motives
While stressing that there was
evidence of both a political and a racial
motive, Justice Thomas spelled out the
implications of earlier decisions that
gerrymandering is unconstitutional only if
race is the "predominant" motive:
A jurisdiction may engage in
constitutional political gerrymandering,
even if it so happens that the most loyal
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Democrats happen to be black Democrats
and even if the state were conscious of
that fact. ... Evidence that blacks
constitute even a supermajonity in one
congressional district while amounting to
less than a plurality in a neighboring
district will not, by itself, suffice to prove
that a jurisdiction was motivated by race
in drawing its district lines, when the
evidence also shows a high correlation
between race and party preference.
The four more-liberal justices, who
have dissented from the earlier decisions
holding that racial gerrymandering violates
the Constitution, did not sign the Thomas
opinion. Rather, they joined in a
concurrence by Justice John Paul Stevens
stressing the evidence that this was a
political gerrymander, not a racial one.
The fate of North Carolina's 12th
District -- represented in the House by
Melvin Watt, a black Democrat -- remains
uncertain. But Justice Thomas' language
will help states figure out how to stay on
the constitutional side of the line in future
redistrictings. This, in turn, may portend a
gradual calming of the legal and political
turmoil over racial gerrymandering that
has raged at least since the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act.
That 1982 legislation was designed to
give black and Hispanic voters, who had
often been submerged in majority-white
districts, more power to elect
representatives of their choice. As
interpreted in 1986 by the (then more
liberal) Supreme Court in Thornburg v.
Gingles, the 1982 amendments were
widely viewed as requiring the creation of
as many majority-black and majority-
Hispanic districts as possible, often by
drawing districts contorted into odd
forms.
Such race-based districting was
pushed by a marriage of convenience that
united civil rights groups and black and
Hispanic politicians seeking safe seats,
with conservative white Republicans who
stood to win more seats if minority voters
were packed into a few districts.
Under both Presidents George Bush
and Bill Clinton, the Justice Department
also pushed states hard to adopt race-
based districting. Powerful objections -
that this cure aggravates the underlying
disease of racial polarization and racial-
bloc voting; that minority voters have less
overall clout in both Congress and state
legislatures when they are packed into a
few districts; and more -- were swept
aside.
Then, in 1993, the Supreme Court's
five conservatives started pushing back.
In Shaw v. Reno, they denounced
efforts to "balkanize us into competing
racial factions," and evinced visceral
distaste for the "bizarre," serpentine shape
that had been drawn to give an earlier
version of North Carolina's 12th
Congressional District a 53 percent black
majority.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor held for
the Court that it was presumptively
unconstitutional to create majority-black
or majority-Hispanic districts if their
shapes were so strange as to evidence an
intent "to separate voters into different
districts on the basis of race." In sending
the case back to the lower court,
O'Connor suggested that such a district
could be justified only if, in some rare
case, it was an indispensable remedy for a
violation of the Voting Rights Act.
The Court's new rule against racial
gerrymandering put its reading of the
Constitution on a collision course with its
reading of the Voting Rights Act in
Gingles, as that decision had been
construed by the Justice Department and
many lower courts.
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The justices followed through in 1995
and 1996 with three 5-4 decisions striking
down majority-black districts as
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders. In
the first of them, Miller v. Georgia, Justice
Anthony Kennedy's opinion denounced
"the Justice Department's implicit
command that states engage in
presumptively unconstitutional race-based
districting" in the name of the Voting
Rights Act. Kennedy held that judges
should subject voting districts to "strict
scrutiny" whenever "race was the
predominant factor" in drawing them.
Neither Miller nor the two 1996
decisions provided much practical
guidance for states that want to draw
districts without violating either the
Voting Rights Act or the Court's
constitutional ban on racial
gerrymandering. Hunt v. Cromartie
brings a bit more predictability to the
scene.
A Path to Accommodation?
This is not to say that Justice Thomas'
opinion entirely ends the confusion, or
that it portends the emergence of
consensus among the Court's
conservatives and liberals. But this small
step toward clarity could point toward an
eventual withering away of the racial
gerrymandering litigation that has so
roiled the courts and the country since
1993.
This is so in part because the Thomas
opinion implicitly suggests a way of
accommodating liberals' desire to see
significant numbers of black and Hispanic
candidates elected with conservatives'
distaste for the use of overt racial
gerrymandering to achieve that result.
Because African-Americans are
among the most loyal of Democrats, the
elected officials who draw district lines
may often find that the most efficient
form of political gerrymandering -- which
is to aggregate precincts with the most
heavily Democratic (or Republican) voting
patterns -- will also create sufficient
concentrations of black voters to help
elect their chosen candidates, many of
whom will also be black.
This does not mean that race-
conscious partisan gerrymandering is or
should be mere camouflage for racial
gerrymandering. A districting plan
motivated mainly by political rather than
racial considerations will tend to produce
more racially integrated, less balkanized
districts, often with large black (or
Hispanic) pluralities rather than majorities.
This will foster the building of cross-racial
coalitions -- not a bad thing. Such political
gerrymandering is also less likely to send
voters the noxious message that they are
supposed to cast their ballots along racial
lines.
The ultimate goal should be to ensure
that black and Hispanic voters have a fair
chance of electing their chosen candidates
without resorting to racial gerrymanders.
As more and more black and Hispanic
candidates win elections in majority-white
districts, that goal seems ever more
achievable. Hunt v. Cromartie brings it
closer still.
Copyright 0 1999 American Lawyer
Newspapers Group, Inc.
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MONROE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.
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Decided May 24, 1999
SUPREME COURT RULING GIVES HARASSED STUDENTS A
WAY OUT
The Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA)
Friday, July 23,1999
Jovan Johnson, 757 Correspondent
SHE SAYS he pinned her against a
wall. She remembers him licking her neck
and biting her on the side of her face. She
remembers him putting his hand on her
crotch.
But she doesn't remember a teacher,
school administrator or guidance
counselor stepping in to stop the incident.
The views of this Cox High School
rising senior reflect those of other
Hampton Roads students who feel
schools are not doing enough to prevent
or remedy sexual harassment in schools.
However, thanks to a recent Supreme
Court ruling, students have a recourse.
In a 5-4 decision, the High Court
ruled that because schools have custodial
authority over students, a school that
receives federal funds can be liable for
damages if nothing is done to stop
reported incidents of harassment.
The case began in 1992 when a
student in Monroe County, Md., reported
incidents of harassment from a fifth-grade
classmate. LaShonda Davis says school
officials did nothing to stop the abuse,
which continued daily for five months.
She says she even considered suicide.
After her complaints were dismissed
by the school board, LaShonda's mother
filed suit in circuit court. The case then
made its way to the Supreme Court, where
justices ruled in favor of LaShonda, now a
teen-ager.
Hampton Roads students applaud the
ruling.
"Schools are required to provide a
certain amount of protection or haven for
a student, and this school in particular
neglected to do this," said Jeff Bozman, a
rising junior at Norfolk Collegiate.
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Some area students say they need to
become more familiar with sexual
harassment policy so they will be able to
make better decisions.
Sexual harassment in schools is illegal,
a form of sexual discrimination under
1972's Title IX decision. Title IX was
exercised in LaShonda's case.
Students understand the importance
of the ruling and see it as fair.
Local school divisions say they take
sexual harassment seriously. Some include
their policies in student handbooks.
"Shortly after the decision, we
reiterated to our principals and staff our
sexual harassment policy, and that
throughout the year, administrators on all
levels are reviewing its policy," said
Norfolk School Board chairwoman Anita
Poston.
Norfolk Senior Deputy City Attorney
Daniel R. Hagemeister says,
"Administrators, counselors, teachers,
faculty members always take these things
seriously."
Hagemeister added he will be
involved with a forum on sexual
harassment scheduled for October in
Norfolk.
He says Norfolk schools are
committed to preventing sexual
harassment, and when an incident does
occur, "punitive actions are swift and
forthcoming. It is not tolerated."
Yvette Guy, a counselor for the sexual
assault counseling group RESPONSE,
says she has noticed a disconnect between
students and teachers.
"Students see sexual harassment
happening in the hallways and classrooms,
but they are afraid of turning students in,
because they believe they will be called
troublemakers or that students will take
revenge on them," Guy says. "The
problem is that our youth live in a culture
where ridicule and intimidation are
acceptable to be considered 'cool.'"
She advises students to be more direct
with teachers and parents. But teachers
must be on the lookout, as well.
"There are things teachers should
notice," Guy says, "such as skipping,
falling grades, sleeping in class, and loss of
interest in activities. Also, decreased
feelings of competence and confidence,
increased anger and frustration, a drop in
work attitude and productivity are other
signs."
Representatives from RESPONSE
visit schools, churches and community
centers.
But groups like RESPONSE can't do
everything, Guy says. Teachers have to be
trained to handle sexual harassment.
And they need to act as soon as
possible.
"Without a system of specially trained
counselors in place, the sexual harassment
policies of schools in Hampton Roads
render themselves ineffective," she says.
Copyright ( 1999 Landmark
Communications, Inc.
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COURT ADOPTS STRICT TEST FOR HARASSMENT LIABILITY
Legal Times
Monday, July 12,1999
Lynne Bemabei
Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999), saw a
Supreme Court engaged in high-handed
policy making and legislative efforts once
again. In defining when sexual harassment
of students by other students violates Title
IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, the Court created a new and
onerous standard of liability.
Last term, in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274
(1998), the Court had held that a student
sexually harassed by a teacher could
recover damages against a school district
only if a school official with authority to
take corrective action was notified of the
harassment and if the official's response
amounted to "deliberate indifference."
Building on Gebser's deliberate
indifference standard, the 5-4 majority in
Davis set an exceedingly high standard for
students sexually harassed by other
students to state an actionable claim
against a school district under Title IX.
The standard is so high that it is
puzzling why the dissent decries the
majority opinion as threatening schools
"beset with litigation from every side." It
is much more likely that Davis will have
the opposite effect-- reducing the number
of federal suits brought by sexually
harassed or abused students. Indeed, Julie
Underwood, general counsel for the
National School Board, echoed the
sentiments expressed by many school
lawyers that it would be "the rare occasion
when a school board is found liable in the
future."
Title IX prohibits students from being
excluded from participation in, being
denied the benefits of, or being subjected
to discrimination under programs or
activities receiving federal funds. Aurelia
Davis alleged that the school's deliberate
indifference to a male student's persistent
sexual advances toward her fifth-grade
daughter LaShonda created an
intimidating, hostile, offensive, and
abusive school environment that violated
Title IX. According to the complaint, a
male classmate attempted to touch her
daughter's breasts and genital area, made
vulgar comments, and continuously acted
in an offensive and sexually suggestive
manner toward LaShonda and other
female students. The school officials to
whom these incidents were reported
allegedly did nothing to stop them. It was
only after the boy was charged with and
pleaded guilty to sexual battery that the
harassment ended. Both the U.S. District
Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 11th Circuit, sitting en banc, found
that such student-on-student harassment
could not provide the basis for damages
under Title IX.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that a damages action for student-on-
student harassment may lie under Title IX
provided that certain conditions are met.
The first condition is that the school must
be found to be "deliberately indifferent"
to the harassment. The Court held that
the school had to be on actual notice of
the harassment, exercise substantial
control over both the harasser and the
context in which the known harassment
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occurred, and respond to the harassment
in a clearly unreasonable manner given the
known circumstances. The second
requirement is that the plaintiff must
show that the harassment is "so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive, and
that it so undermines and detracts from
the victims' educational experience, that
the victims are effectively denied equal
access to an institution's resources and
opportunities."
RAISING THE BAR
This standard for demonstrating that
misconduct in the school context under
Tide IX rises to the level of actionable
sexual harassment is much higher than the
standard in the employment context
under Tide VII. In Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), and
Harris v. Forklift Systems Inc., 510 U.S.
17 (1993), the Court held that an
employer violates Tide VII by creating or
tolerating a sexually hostile work
environment, defined as an environment
that is intimidating, hostile, or offensive
on the basis of sex, and that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter an employee's
working conditions. But under Davis, the
misconduct must be severe and pervasive
and offensive, and it must rise to a high
enough level that it effectively denies a
student equal access to educational
opportunities. While Meritor and Harris
read these terms in the disjunctive, Davis
reads them in the conjunctive.
The Davis Court expressly held that it
was not "necessary to show physical
exclusion to demonstrate that students
have been deprived by the action of
another student . .. of an educational
opportunity on the basis of sex." Taken to
its logical conclusion, however, the
decision does force a plaintiff to endure a
significant amount of harassment to show
that she was denied equal access to the
school's resources. Courts could easily
dismiss cases of highly disturbing
harassment on the ground that the
conduct was directed against one student
only and thus was not pervasive, or on the
ground that the harassment was not
sufficiently severe because the student
persevered under the pressure, attending
class every day.
It is hard to understand why the
protections afforded to the most
vulnerable of our citizens--children in
school, who cannot simply opt to go
elsewhere-- should be so much weaker
than for adults, who in many cases can
choose to leave a hostile and dangerous
work environment.
As noted, the Davis Court borrowed
from Gebser by holding that the school
must have actual notice of the harassment
and be "deliberately indifferent" to it. In
the process of justifying this deliberate
indifference standard for teacher-on-
student harassment, the Gebser Court
analogized the standard to the one used
by the Department of Education in
administratively enforcing Tide IX's
requirements. Under that standard, an
administrative agency may not initiate
enforcement proceedings against a
recipient of federal funds until it has
advised the appropriate person of the
failure to comply with the requirement
and determined that compliance could not
be secured voluntarily.
The Gebser Court concluded that the
implied damages remedy for Tide IX
should be judicially developed along the
same lines. The most closely analogous
standard would be deliberate indifference,
which the Court reasoned was the judicial
equivalent of "an official decision by the
recipient not to remedy the violation."
The Court ostensibly supported this
high standard by reference to the
deliberate indifference standard for
Section 1983 claims that allege that
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municipalities failed to prevent a
deprivation of federal rights. Of course,
that standard was itself judicially
developed, without reference to the
statutory language of Section 1983, for the
express purpose of limiting municipal
liability.
In addition, it is likely that the Gebser
Court actually derived the deliberate
indifference standard from an opinion by
Chief Judge Richard Posner of the 7th
Circuit, dissenting from a denial of
rehearing en banc in Doe v. University of
Illinois, 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998). In
an opinion issued just three months
before Gebser, the 7th Circuit found that
student-on- student sexual harassment
violated Title IX under certain
circumstances. Posner recommended the
adoption of a deliberate indifference
standard of liability because it "would give
schools substantial protection against
being sued for failing to guess right about
the proper management of sexual and
related nastiness among their charges."
Posner admitted that Title IX does
not contain this or any other standard of
liability. All the cases cited by the judge to
support his importation of the deliberate
indifference standard into Title IX
concerned Section 1983 claims, including
those against public school districts, not
Title IX claims.
One threshold question left
unanswered is whether this deliberate
indifference standard differs from
"reckless indifference." The 3rd Circuit
considers deliberate indifference to be
synonymous with reckless indifference,
reckless disregard, and gross negligence,
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir.
1996), while the 9th Circuit rates
deliberate indifference as a higher
standard of liability than reckless
indifference and gross negligence, L.W. v.
Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1996). The
Supreme Court, in a more recent Section
1983 case, did not resolve the
proliferation or differentiation of these
standards, simply stating that deliberate
indifference "is a stringent standard of
fault, requiring proof that a municipal
actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action." Board of
County Commissioners v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397 (1997).
It is difficult to reconcile Gebser and
Davis with Kolstad v. American Dental
Association, 67 U.S.L.W. 4552 (June 22,
1999), decided by the Court only a month
after Davis. Kolstad says that punitive
damages under Title VII require a
showing of "malice or reckless
indifference"--not the "deliberate
indifference" now required under Title IX
to simply prove liability. Yet there is little
in Title IX to justify this more onerous
standard.
Stripped of its dicta, the Supreme
Court's adoption of the deliberate
indifference standard in Gebser and Davis
seems nothing short of judicial legislation
of an extremely high hurdle for students
trying to invoke federal civil rights
protection for sexual harassment. The
Court has provided less protection than
that recommended by the Department of
Education's Office of Civil Rights in its
1997 "Sexual Harassment Guidance,"
which said that student-on-student
harassment falls within the scope of Title
IX. The Court has also provided less
protection than did the three circuits that
previously held student-on-student sexual
harassment actionable under Title IX.
Ironically, in cutting back the protection
afforded students in public schools, the
Court has engaged in the very judicial
activism it has long criticized in lower
courts that vigorously enforce the civil
rights laws.
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Bernabei & Katz specializing in
employment discrimination matters. The
author wishes to thank summer associate
Gena Wiltsek for her assistance with this
article.
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RULING WIDENS CRITERIA FOR BIAS SUITS, NARROWS
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY
The Houston Chronicle
Wednesday, June 23,1999
Steve Lash, Houston Chronicle Washington Bureau
WASHINGTON - The Supreme
Court, in a ruling that pleased neither
management nor labor, made it easier
Tuesday both for companies to escape
liability for intentional discrimination and
for women and minorities to bring
lawsuits alleging deliberate bias in the
workplace.
In a 5-4 decision, the high court said
employers can avoid being assessed
punitive damages in bias cases if they can
show they made good-faith efforts to
comply with Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which prohibits job
discrimination. These efforts could
include having a strong company policy
prohibiting harassment and bias, the court
said.
As it was advising employers on
avoiding liability, the court was relaxing
the burden on workers seeking to prove
their employers intentionally discriminated
against them, a violation of law that could
entitle the employees to punitive damages.
The justices held that bias victims need
only show that an employer recklessly or
maliciously violated Title VII.
A lower federal court had placed a
much greater burden on discrimination
victims, requiring them to prove that the
violation of law was "egregious" before
they could collect punitive damages.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing
for the majority on the issue of what
employers must do, said a company that
makes good-faith efforts to comply with
the law cannot be found to have acted
with malice or reckless indifference to the
statute. Permitting employers to be held
liable despite strong efforts to comply
with Title VII would discourage them
from going to the effort and expense of
educating their employees, she said.
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She was joined in that part of the
opinion by Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, Anthony M.
Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.
The dissenters on the issue were
Justices John Paul Stevens, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
G. Breyer.
O'Connor gained the support of six
other justices for the part of her opinion
calling for juries to award punitive
damages if they find that an employer
acted "with malice or with reckless
indifference" to an employee's rights
under the law. That proof standard,
addressing the mental state of the
employer, is clearly stated in the statute
and is easier to prove than the district
court's more onerous demand that
employees show the employer acted
egregiously, she said. Joining that portion
of O'Connor's opinion were Stevens,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer.
Rehnquist, joined by Thomas,
dissented, stating that employees are
entitled to punitive damages under the law
"only for the worst cases of intentional
discrimination."
With its decision, the high court
revived lobbyist Carole Kolstad's effort to
recover punitive damages from her
employer, the American Dental
Association. A U.S. district court jury in
Washington, D.C., found the employer
intentionally discriminated against Kolstad
when it promoted a man over her to be
director of legislative policy.
Copyright (1999 The Houston Chronicle
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NEW LIMITS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES IMPOSED
Legal Times
Monday, July 12,1999
Debra S. Katz
Ignoring the clear constitutional
mandate to avoid judicial legislation, the
Supreme Court ended this term by
essentially amending statutes that attack
discrimination. The Court acted to protect
employers from punitive damages liability
in Kolstad v. American Dental
Association, 67 U.S.L.W. 4552 (June 22,
1999), and public schools from liability in
all but the most extreme cases in Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education, 119
S. Ct. 1661 (May 24, 1999). (See
accompanying article.) While paying lip
service to expanding the rights of the
aggrieved, the Court dredged safe harbors
found nowhere in either of the laws at
issue. In Kolstad, the creation of a "good
faith" standard is particularly galling given
that neither party addressed the question
during the litigation, the American Dental
Association expressly disavowed that the
question was before the Court, and the
facts of the case did not present a basis on
which to create such a defense.
Why then is the Court's majority so
willing to forget the words of Justice
Louis Brandeis that "to supply omissions
transcends the judicial function"? The
answer is apparent: The majority is
unwilling to accept Congress' considered
judgment that punitive damages are
necessary to strengthen employee rights
and aggressively deter employer violations.
In passing the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Congress was clearly frustrated that
discrimination continued even though
"virtually everyone in America now
understands that it is both wrong 'and
illegal' to discriminate intentionally." In
providing for punitive damages under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Congress sent a clear signal it was serious
about ending job discrimination and that
one way to do this was to impose financial
penalties that would make employers
think twice.
But now, instead of reading the
express language of Section 1981a to
permit punitive damages when a
nongovernmental employer discriminates
"with malice or with reckless indifference
to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual," the Court has
supplanted its own policy-making
judgment. It has adopted extra-statutory
standards to make punitive damages
unavailable where an employer can
demonstrate that discrimination by
managerial agents was "contrary to the
employer's good-faith efforts to comply
with Title VII.' "
After hearing seven days of testimony
in Kolstad, the jury concluded that the
American Dental Association (ADA) had
intentionally discriminated against Carole
Kolstad on the basis of her gender by
denying her a promotion. The judge
refused to instruct the jury on punitive
damages, even though the evidence
demonstrated that the ADA's violation of
Title VII was willful. Specifically, the
evidence indicated that Kolstad was the
more qualified of two job candidates, and
that the decision-makers, who were senior
executives, exhibited animus toward
women by telling sexually offensive jokes
325
in staff meetings and in one-on-one
sessions with Kolstad and by referring to
professional women in such derogatory
terms as "bitch" and "battle-axe."
The evidence further supported an
inference that the executives not only
deliberately refused to consider Kolstad
fairly for the promotion, but also
manipulated the job requirements and
conducted a "sham" selection procedure
to conceal their misconduct. For example,
the evidence demonstrated that the ADA
groomed the preselected male candidate
and that the decision-makers interviewed
only that man for the position. Kolstad
also adduced evidence showing that
women were seriously underrepresented
in the ADA's upper ranks.
Finally, the court prevented Kolstad
from offering evidence concerning the
ADA's prior litigation of a gender-
discrimination class action. The resulting
consent decree in that case expressly
forbade the preselection of a candidate in
a promotion setting.
The ADA put on no evidence that its
two decision-makers were ignorant of
Title VII's requirements, that they had
violated an internal equal employment
policy instituted in good faith, or that they
had any good-faith reason for believing
that being a man was a legitimate
requirement for the job. Rather, as Justice
John Paul Stevens noted in his separate
opinion, the ADA resorted to false,
pretextual explanations for its refusal to
promote Kolstad.
Standards Deviation
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower
court's decision denying a punitive
damages instruction and rejected the
ADA's assertion that punitive damages are
available under Title VII only in
"extraordinarily egregious" cases. But on
rehearing en banc, a narrowly divided
D.C. Circuit turned around and sustained
the rejection of the punitive damages
claim, holding that "before the question
of punitive damages can go to the jury,
the evidence of the defendant's culpability
must exceed what is needed to show
intentional discrimination." The court said
that a defendant must be shown to have
engaged in "egregious misconduct" before
a jury would be permitted to consider
punitive damages.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to resolve a conflict among the circuit
courts concerning the standard of conduct
needed to permit a request for punitive
damages to go to the jury.
In a 7-2 decision, the Court rejected
the "egregious misconduct" standard and
held that the "malice or reckless
indifference" standard focuses on the
defendant's state of mind--not the degree
of its misconduct. To be liable in punitive
damages, a defendant must be shown to
have discriminated "in the face of a
perceived risk that its actions will violate
federal law." The Court noted that while
egregious or outrageous acts support an
inference of the requisite "evil motive,"
the act in question need not have some
independently egregious quality to justify
punitive damages.
The Court noted that "there will be
circumstances where intentional
discrimination does not give rise to
punitive damages liability." Where an
employer is "simply unaware of the
relevant prohibition" because the
underlying theory of discrimination is
"novel or otherwise poorly recognized,"
or where an employer "discriminates with
the distinct belief that its discrimination is
lawful" because it satisfies a statutory
exception to liability, an employer will
escape punitive damages.
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Not satisfied with giving employers
this escape hatch, the Court by a 5-4
majority created out of whole cloth yet
another limitation on punitive damages.
While the statute has no such
requirement, Kolstad calls for an
aggrieved plaintiff not only to
demonstrate that the employer acted with
malice or reckless indifference to her
federally protected rights, but also to offer
evidence to "impute liability for punitive
damages" to the employer.
After acknowledging that, "in express
terms, Congress has directed federal
courts to interpret Title VII based on
agency principles," the Court refused to
adopt common law principles or the
Restatement (Second) of Agency or the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. These
provide that punitive damages are
properly awarded against a principal
because of an agent's act if: (1) the
principal authorized the doing and
manner of the act; (2) the agent was unfit,
and the principal was reckless in
employing him; (3) the agent was
employed in a managerial capacity and
was acting in the scope of employment; or
(4) the principal or his managerial agent
ratified or approved the act.
Noting that the Restatement of
Agency provides that even intentional
torts are within the scope of employment
if the conduct "is the kind the agent is
employed to perform," "occurs
substantially within the authorized time
and space limits," and "is actuated, at least
in part, by a purpose to serve" the
employer, the Court--on strictly policy
grounds--rejected application of such a
standard. It stated: "On this view, even an
employer who makes every effort to
comply with Title VII would be held liable
for the discriminatory acts of agents acting
in a managerial capacity.' " This, the Court
concluded, "would reduce the incentive
for employers to implement anti-
discrimination programs."
Endorsing the amicus argument of the
business-sponsored Equal Employment
Advisory Council, the Court reasoned that
"such a rule would likely exacerbate
concerns among employers that Section
1981a's malice 'and reckless indifference'
standard penalizes those employers who
educate themselves and their employees
on Title VII's prohibitions." The majority
observed that "dissuading employers from
implementing programs or policies to
prevent discrimination in the workplace is
directly contrary to the purposes
underlying Title VII."
After condemning the "perverse
incentives that the Restatement's scope of
employment rules create," the Court said
it was "compelled to modify these
principles to avoid undermining the
objectives underlying Title VII." It held:
"In a punitive damages context, an
employer may not be vicariously liable for
the discriminatory employment decisions
of managerial agents where these
decisions are contrary to the employer's
good-faith efforts to comply with Title
VII.' " Thus, regardless of the intentional
discrimination perpetuated, the egregious
nature of the offense, or the harm caused,
an employer that has undertaken "good
faith" efforts at Title VII compliance
thereby "demonstrates that it never acted
in reckless disregard of federally protected
rights."
In Good Faith
The Court cited D.C. Circuit Judge
David Tatel's en banc dissent in support
of its good-faith defense. Notably, Tatel
referenced objective standards for an
employer to meet in order to avoid
punitive damages liability. He stated that
an employer could properly argue that:
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it should not have to pay punitive
damages because it had undertaken
good faith efforts to comply with
Title VII--for example, by hiring
staff and managers sensitive to Title
VII responsibilities, by requiring
effective EEO training, or by
developing and using objective
hiring and promotion standards.
The Kolstad decision thus seems to
indicate that the good-faith exemption is
an affirmative defense for which the
employer bears the burden of proof, akin
to that established in Burlington
Industries Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998), and Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775 (1998). Given that it is a defense
to punitive damages liability, courts
should certainly place the burden on
employers to prove their entitlement to
this defense--not place yet another burden
on plaintiffs by requiring them to prove
the lack of good faith.
Although Kolstad states that an
employer may avoid punitive damages
liability only if it can show that it "had
been making good faith efforts to enforce
an antidiscrimination policy," the majority
opinion fails to provide guidance as to
how much an employer must actually do
to avail itself of this defense. Judge Tatel's
cited opinion makes clear that
promulgation of a written policy will not
be enough. The approach adopted by
many lower courts in sending to the jury
factual issues concerning the
''reasonableness" of the employer's and
employee's actions as elements of the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense is
obviously the preferred course. Like that
of reasonableness, the standard of good
faith is quintessentially a fact-based, value-
laden determination that should be
decided by juries, not judges.
Kolstad will necessarily expand the
discovery needs of plaintiffs trying to
defeat an employer's good-faith defense to
punitive damages. Plaintiffs will need to
take comprehensive discovery about the
employer's reasons for promulgating
EEO policies and its bona fides in
implementing and enforcing them. For
example, in Cadena v. The Pacesetter
Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (D. Kan.
1998), the court found that while the
employer's sexual harassment policy
looked reasonable, related memorandums
revealed a disdain for the 1991 Civil
Rights Act and "mocked the right of
female employees to be free from sexual
harassment."
An employer's recklessness may
certainly be proven by expressions of
hostility to or resentment of civil rights
laws. So too may it be proven by evidence
of a pervasive or lengthy pattern of
discriminatory behavior, and by improper
or nonresponsive reactions to complaints
of discrimination. If the employer invokes
a good-faith defense, it should not be able
to prevent the admission of prior bad acts
evidence related to Title VII compliance.
Indeed, an employer's entire EEO record
should become admissible. In Kolstad, the
ADA's record, including the consent
decree, should presumably be admissible
during the punitive damages trial.
However appropriately courts may
handle this new good faith defense,
fundamentally Kolstad flies in the face of
the clear language of Section 1981a and
congressional intent in enacting a punitive
damages provision. The legislative history
demonstrates that Congress chose to
protect the interest of businesses by
capping damages, not by narrowing the
standard for punitive damages liability or
providing safe harbors for employers.
Because Kolstad was a case of statutory
construction, Congress' judgment should
have controlled--not the Supreme Court's
view of the best way to "incentivize"
employers to comply with the law.
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Debra S. Katz is a partner in D.C.'s
Bernabei & Katz specializing in
employment discrimination matters.
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Karen SUTTON and Kimberly HINTON, petitioners
V.
United Air Lines, Inc.
No. 97-1943
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 22, 1999
JUSTICES RAISE BAR TO QUALIFY AS DISABLED
Austin American-Statesman
Wednesday, June 23, 1999
Joan Biskupic
WASHINGTON - The Supreme
Court significantly curtailed the scope of a
federal law designed to protect disabled
workers from discrimination Tuesday. By
a 7-2 vote, the justices ruled that the
Americans With Disabilities Act does not
cover people whose disabilities can be
sufficiently corrected with medicine,
eyeglasses or other measures.
In their broadest look at the ADA to
date, the justices decided four disabilities
cases, the most important being a pair of
rulings that would prevent millions of
people from seeking coverage under the
landmark 1990 law. The highly anticipated
rulings could profoundly affect people
with a range of impairments -- from
diabetes and hypertension to severe
nearsightedness and hearing loss -- who
are able to function in society with the
help of medicines or aids but whose
impairments may still make employers
consider them ineligible for certain jobs.
"These decisions create the absurd
result of a person being disabled enough
to be fired from a job, but not disabled
enough to challenge the firing," said
Georgetown University law professor
Chai Feldblum, who helped draft the
statute and who was one of several
advocates who said they would ask
Congress to change the law.
The rulings represent a substantial win
for employers, who praised the court's
decision to limit who is covered by the
statute. "Employers make reasonable
accommodations for employees who are
truly disabled," said Steve Bokat, general
counsel at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, "but they should not have to
relax necessary standards for employees
who have common and easily correctable
ailments."
The disability cases were closely
followed by workers, businesses, civil
rights advocates and the Clinton
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administration, which had urged the
justices to interpret the law in a broad
manner.
By identical votes of 7-2 in a pair of
cases -- one involving two nearsighted
pilots and the other a mechanic with high
blood pressure -- the court ruled that
when judges assess whether a worker
pressing a disability-bias suit qualifies as
"disabled" under the law, they must take
into account any measures that lessen the
worker's impairment.
By a unanimous vote in Albertson's
vs. Kirkingburg, the justices ruled that
employers who set job qualifications
based on federal safety standards are not
required to dispense with those standards
when a worker -- in this case, a truck
driver blind in one eye -- obtains a waiver
from the federal agency.
Also, by a 6-3 vote, the court ruled
that states must place certain people with
mental disabilities in community homes
rather than hospitals.
Enacted after years of effort, the
Americans with Disabilities Act was
meant to open jobs and public spaces to
the nation's then-estimated 43 million
disabled people. The law defines a
"disability" as a "physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or
more ... major life activities." On
Tuesday, the court addressed the most
fundamental question of how to
determine who is and is not disabled.
The main ruling dealt with twin sisters
from Spokane, Wash., Karen Sutton and
Kimberly Hinton, who were turned down
for pilot jobs at United Air Lines because
of their extreme nearsightedness, failing
the airline's minimum requirement for
uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100.
When they sued under the ADA, judges
said the law did not cover people who can
correct their disabilities -- in this case,
with glasses -- and get along as well as
most other people.
Tuesday, the Supreme Court agreed,
rejecting the position of the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
and the majority of federal appeals courts.
"Looking at the Act as a whole,"
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for
the majority, "it is apparent that if a
person is taking measures to correct for,
or mitigate, a physical or mental
impairment, the effects of those measures
-- both positive and negative -- must be
taken into account when judging whether
that person is 'substantially limited' in a
major life activity."
O'Connor noted that Congress had
written in the law that "some 43 million
Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities" and argued that if the
law were intended to cover all those with
common, correctable impairments such as
nearsightedness, that figure would have
been far larger.
But the majority also emphasized that
whether a person has a disability is an
individual question and that some people
who have prosthetic limbs or other
corrective devices could still be
considered "disabled" because of a
substantial limitation of their life activities.
O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justices Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter,
Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
as well as in the ruling involving a
mechanic with hypertension, Murphy v.
United Parcel Service.
Dissenting in both cases were Justices
John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer. In
a statement written by Stevens, they said,
"To be faithful to the remedial purpose of
the Act, we should give it a generous,
rather than a miserly construction."
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Roy Englert, who represented United,
said he was pleased with the court's ruling,
which was cheered by other employers as
well. Human resources lawyer Ted Gies
said the court provided important
"clarification" about who is covered by
the ADA and its decision will help to
reduce ADA lawsuits. "Most people
would say," Gies said, "that the biggest
human resource and legal challenge is the
ADA."
But Michael Greene, a lawyer for the
American Diabetes Association, said the
ruling puts people who take medicine to
function in society in a difficult position.
"You're damned if you don't medicate,
but you're damned if you do, because you
lose your legal rights," Greene said,
adding that sometimes impaired persons
who can do the job might nonetheless
seek special accommodations or extra
time off for medical care.
Copyright C 1999 The Austin American-
Statesman
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PARSING DISABILITY LAW
Court's ADA Ruhngs Are Tough on Plaintiffs
New York Law Journal
Thursday, July 1, 1999
Lisa L Fried
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT's
rulings last week clarifying who is disabled
under the Americans with Disabilities Act
are being hailed as a victory for employers
and a devastating blow to impaired
employees.
Management attorneys say the Court's
narrowing of the definition of a disability
to conditions that are not medically
correctable will reduce the number of
frivolous suits filed under the ADA and
make it easier for employers to beat those
claims. Plaintiffs' attorneys say the
Supreme Court has cut the heart out of
the ADA, giving employers a green light
to discriminate against those with treatable
conditions, such as epilepsy, cancer and
diabetes.
Attorneys on both sides said future
litigation in the lower courts will focus on
whether a plaintiff has fully corrected a
condition, since the High Court did not
clearly define that issue. Furthermore,
many predict the stringent nature of the
ruling will prompt more plaintiffs to seek
relief under state laws that provide
broader protection than does the ADA.
The Scope of the ADA
The ADA prohibits employers from
discriminating against an individual on the
basis of a disability. The 1990 statute,
which went into effect in 1992, does not
clearly define a protected disability.
Under the statute, a person is disabled if
he or she possesses a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, has a record of
such an impairment, or is regarded as
having such an impairment.
On June 22, the Court provided some
clarity, ruling in a trio of cases that
individuals who use medication, medical
devices or other measures to fully correct
their impairments are not disabled and
thus not protected by the ADA. The
disability must be present and actual, the
Court said.
Employment attorneys on both sides
say the 7-2 ruling in Sutton v. United Air
Lines Inc., 97-1943, which the High Court
also followed in Albertson's Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 98-591, and Murphy v.
United Parcel Service, 97-1992, will have a
dramatic effect on disability discrimination
claims.
Contact Lenses
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, two
near-sighted twin pilots sued a commercial
airline that failed to hire them based on
their vision impairment. The Court ruled
in favor of the employer, finding that the
pilots were not disabled under the ADA
because the use of contact lenses or
glasses improved their vision perfectly.
"A person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by medication or
other measures does not have an
impairment that presently 'substantially
limits' a major life activity," the Court
said.
In limiting the class of disabled
individuals protected by the ADA, the
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Court looked to the plain language of the
statute. In the majority opinion in Sutton,
Justice Sandra O'Connor wrote, "Because
the phrase 'substantially limits' appears in
the Act in the present indicative verb
form, we think the language is properly
read as requiring that a person be
presently -- not potentially or
hypothetically -- substantially limited in
order to demonstrate a disability."
However, Justice O'Connor added,
the ADA does protect individuals who are
still substantially limited in a major life
activity after taking medication or using a
medical device, reiterating the statute's
requirement that the determination of a
disability be made on a case-by-case basis.
The ADA does not define major life
activity, but Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission regulations
define it to include working, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
caring for one's self, walking and
performing manual tasks.
In the Sutton case, the plaintiffs had
argued that they were substantially limited
in the major life activity of working, since
United Airlines failed to hire them.
However, the Court said that plaintiffs
making such arguments must prove that
despite the fact that they possess the
requisite skills, their impairment precludes
them from being considered for a broad
class of jobs.
Since in this case, the pilots could be
employed by other airlines that do not
impose the same vision requirement on
pilots, they are not substantially limited in
working and not covered by the statute,
the Court said.
"These three Supreme Court decisions
will have a considerable impact on ADA
cases," said John Canoni, a partner with
Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, who
represents employers. "The federal
courthouse doors are no longer wide open
to individuals with physical or mental
impairments that are corrected by
medications or other measures."
This more stringent definition of
disability should reduce the number of
cases brought on the federal level and in
states such as Massachusetts, New
Hampshire and Rhode Island, whose anti-
discrimination laws mirror the ADA
definition, attorneys said.
And many attorneys predict that when
plaintiffs do initiate suits under the ADA,
employers will be even more likely to
receive summary judgment.
Last year, plaintiffs brought 408 cases
under the ADA, according to the
American Bar Association. In total, 297
cases reached a final resolution, with
employers prevailing 94 percent of the
time.
"Employers are much more successful
in these cases because a lot of these cases
are brought by folks who are not really
disabled but who have a temporary
injury," said Ira Rosenstein, a partner with
the New York office of Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe, who represents
employers. "Those cases trivialize the
cases brought by people who have true
disabilities and need the protection of the
Act," he said.
Indeed, many employment attorneys
believe that the Supreme Court's decision
reflects its desire to slash the number of
frivolous ADA suits. While lawyers on
both sides concede this is valuable,
plaintiffs' attorneys say the Court went
too far.
"The Court has thrown the baby out
with the bath water," said Adam Klein, a
partner with Levy Davis Maher & Klein,
who represents plaintiffs. "The facts of
the Sutton case have now led to a parsing
down of the ADA to the point that only
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those people who are traditionally
disabled, those who are in a wheelchair,
deaf or blind, are covered," Mr. Klein
continued.
"I am concerned that these decisions
may discourage lawyers from bringing the
really good cases," added plaintiffs'
attorney Jonathan Ben-Asher, a partner
with Beranbaum Menken Ben-Asher &
Fishel. "I don't think Congress intended
to remove a huge number of people from
ADA coverage because they are trying to
function as best as they can on the job."
Unanswered Questions
Furthermore, the ruling leave
unanswered what type of conditions are
fully correctable. "While vision is clearly
correctable with glasses, what about a
cancer patient who undergoes
chemotherapy and may be in remission or
a person with dyslexia who has taught
himself to overcome it?" asked Mr.
Rosenstein.
The ruling also affirmed parts of the
ADA that protect employers. For
example, the statute does not require
employers to hire a disabled individual if
that person cannot perform the essential
job functions. Some attorneys believe
that Sutton took that concept a step
further, empowering employers to use
broad discretion in determining whether
an individual is qualified for the job.
The Sutton Court said that the ADA
allows employers to favor some physical
attributes over others and establish
physical criteria for job requirements.
"An employer is free to decide that
physical characteristics or medical
conditions that do not rise to the level of
an impairment -- such as one's height,
build or singing voice -- are preferable to
others, just as it is free to decide that some
limiting, but not substantially limiting
impairments make individuals less than
ideally suited for a job," Justice O'Connor
wrote.
This part of the decision will give
employers' ammunition to argue that any
medical condition of an employee will
disqualify the person based on the
physical job requirements, said Mr. Klein.
This runs contrary to the purpose of the
statute, he said, which is to prevent
employers from making employment
decisions based solely on stereotypical
thinking.
Added James Carr, chairman of the
ABA's commission on mental and
physical disability law, "It is a dangerous
comment that could open the door to
people making employment decisions
based on inappropriate criterion."
State and Local Laws
Given the tougher road plaintiffs face
under the ADA, those based in states
such as New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut, which define disability more
broadly than does the federal law, will
look to state law for relief. Many
plaintiffs' attorneys already add claims
under state and local laws to their ADA
suits brought in federal court. Attorneys
said that more will likely do so or instead
bring cases in state court.
In New York, the state's Executive
Law and New York City's Administrative
Code give disabled plaintiffs more
protection against discrimination than
does the ADA.
Neither the city law nor the state law
require an individual to have a disability
that is substantially limiting. Rather, @
292 (21a) of the Executive Law defines a
disability as a physical, mental or medical
impairment resulting from anatomical,
physiological, genetic or neurological
conditions, which prevents the exercise of
a normal bodily function or is
demonstrable by medically accepted
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techniques. Claims can also be brought if
others regard the individual as disabled, or
if the employee has a record of his or her
impairment.
Section 8-102 (16) of the city's
Administrative Code defines a disability as
any physical, medical, mental or
psychological impairment, or a history or
record of such impairment.
In New York City, plaintiffs' attorneys
who do not bring disability discrimination
claims under federal, state and city law will
be committing malpractice, said one
attorney.
Copyright © 1999 New York Law
Publishing Company
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JUSTICES REJECT "UNNECESSARY SEGREGATION" OF
MENTALLY DISABLED AT STATE HOSPITALS
Los Angeles Times
Wednesday, June 23,1999
David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer
In a landmark victory for people with
mental disabilities, the Supreme Court
ruled Tuesday that patients in state mental
hospitals have a right to leave these
institutions and move to small,
community homes whenever they and
their doctors think they are ready to do so.
The "unnecessary segregation of
persons with mental disabilities" is a form
of discrimination outlawed by the
Americans With Disabilities Act, the court
said on a 6-3 vote.
Tuesday's ruling does not mean that
most patients in these hospitals will be
leaving soon, or perhaps ever. For many
psychiatric problems, a hospital is the best
and most appropriate setting, the court
said. During the 1970s, officials erred by
closing too many facilities and sending
troubled patients out into the streets with
no care or supervision.
The focus of the decision was on
those patients who could be cared for just
as well in a community home rather than
in a large institution.
Some advocates said the ruling means
the end of the "Nurse Ratchet method,"
referring to the dominating, steely-eyed
villain in the fictional mental institution
featured in the movie "One Flew Over
the Cuckoo's Nest."
Before 1955, more than 500,000
patients were housed in mental hospitals
across the nation. Once considered a
progressive form of treatment, these
hospitals were scorned as prisons for
patients in recent decades. These days,
only an estimated 75,000 beds remain in
state facilities for those with mental
impairments.
The court's ruling Tuesday stemmed
from a case in Georgia, where state
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officials maintained that they had the
authority to decide which form of
treatment was better, even when their
own doctors preferred the community
homes.
Their policy was challenged by two
mentally retarded women, Lois Curtis and
Elaine Wilson, who hoped to leave the
Georgia Regional Hospital in Atlanta.
Doctors at the facility agreed that they
were ready to move to a community home
but hospital officials balked.
"The institution was not for me,"
Wilson said in a telephone interview. "All
you do is eat and sleep." After moving to
a community home during the course of
litigation, Wilson said that she became
active in programs that taught her to cook
and to care for herself.
A federal judge in Atlanta ruled for
the two women, as did the U.S. Court of
Appeals. Georgia's director of human
resources, Tommy Olmstead, appealed on
states' rights grounds.
For disability-rights activists, the case
was hailed as the "Brown vs. Board of
Education decision" for the disabled, a
reference to the 1954 ruling that outlawed
racial segregation in public schools.
In California, a coalition representing
24 groups statewide that help persons
with disabilities called the ruling "a
milestone for the independent-living
movement."
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote the
majority opinion in the case (Olmstead vs.
L.C., 98-536). Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas dissented.
Copyright C 1999 Times Mirror Company
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STATES LIMITED ON INSTITUTIONALIZATION
The New York Times
Wednesday, June 23, 1999
Linda Greenhouse
Isolating people with disabilities in big
state institutions when there is no medical
reason for their confinement is a form of
discrimination that violates Federal
disabilities law, the Supreme Court ruled
today.
The 6-to-3 decision, in a case brought
against the State of Georgia by two
women with mental impairment, was a
substantial victory for a disabilities rights
movement that has looked to the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
as a tool for breaking down institutional
walls that separate people with serious
mental and physical problems from the
larger community.
The ruling affirmed, in most respects,
a decision last year by the Federal appeals
court in Atlanta, which held that states
have a duty under the 1990 law to provide
care in group homes when medically
appropriate. In 1994, the Federal appeals
court in Philadelphia, in the only other
appellate decision on the subject, reached
the same result.
The Supreme Court's decision six
months ago to hear Georgia's appeal in
this case alarmed advocates for people
with disabilities, who feared that the Court
might steer the law in the opposite
direction and reverse the nationwide trend
toward deinstitutionalization. An
unusually vigorous grass-roots campaign
sprang up around the case, leading 15 of
the 22 states that had originally supported
Georgia to disavow the state's position in
the Supreme Court.
The case involved a 1995 lawsuit filed
on behalf of Lois Curtis and Elaine
Wilson, both of them mentally retarded
and mentally ill, who sought state care
outside the Georgia Regional Hospital,
where they had lived off and on for years.
Both remained in the hospital for several
years after state doctors had concluded
that they could be more appropriately
cared for in small group homes.
In some respects, the decision today
was the Court's first rather than last word
on the subject, and it may require more
cases to clarify the full dimensions of the
ruling. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
majority opinion held that states'
obligation to care for people in small,
neighborhood-based settings was limited
to some degree by available resources.
States are not required to close their big
hospitals -- which, the Court emphasized,
may still be appropriate for some people -
- or to create group home programs that
they do not now have. (In fact, though,
every state now has such a program.)
The decision interpreted a regulation
that requires states to make "reasonable
modifications" in their programs to avoid
discriminating against people with
disabilities, while at the same time
providing that states need not make
"fundamental" alterations.
Justice Ginsburg said that if a state
"were to demonstrate that it had a
comprehensive, effectively working plan
for placing qualified persons with mental
disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a
waiting list that moved at a reasonable
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pace not controlled by the state's
endeavors to keep its institutions fully
populated, the reasonable-modifications
standard would be met."
That interpretation did not give the
states enough leeway to satisfy the three
dissenting Justices. Justice Clarence
Thomas, joined in a dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justice Antonin Scalia, said the decision
imposed "significant federalism costs"
and failed to "respect the states' historical
role as the dominant authority responsible
for providing services to individuals with
disabilities."
Justice Thomas predicted that states
would "now be forced to defend
themselves in Federal court every time
resources prevent the immediate
placement of a qualified individual." He
said that rather than addressing
discrimination in any conventional sense,
the majority was imposing its own
"standard of care."
The majority opinion was joined by
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, David H.
Souter, John Paul Stevens and Stephen G.
Breyer. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
concurred in a separate opinion, noting
that "the depopulation of state mental
hospitals has its dark side" and warning
that the decision should not be interpreted
"to drive those in need of medical care
and treatment out of appropriate care and
into settings with too little assistance and
supervision." Justice Breyer also signed
that part of Justice Kennedy's opinion.
While the decision, Olmstead v. L.C.,
No. 98-536, referred throughout to
mental disabilities, the ruling also applies
to the states' obligations to people with
serious physical disabilities.
The decision interpreted Title II of
the disabilities act, which prohibits state
and local governments from
discriminating against people or excluding
them from programs "by reason of" their
disabilities. A regulation issued by the
Attorney General at Congress's direction,
after the law's adoption, provides that "a
public entity shall administer services,
programs and activities in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs
of qualified individuals with disabilities,"
with "integrated setting" defined as "a
setting that enables individuals with
disabilities to interact with nondisabled
persons to the fullest extent possible."
Georgia argued that the two mentally
impaired women involved in the case did
not come within the disabilities law's
protection because they had not been
subjected to discrimination, which the
state defined as unequal treatment. Justice
Ginsburg said today that in the context of
the Federal law, "unjustified isolation, we
hold, is properly regarded as
discrimination based on disability."
"Institutional placement of persons
who can handle and benefit from
community setting perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of
participating in community life," Justice
Ginsburg continued. She added that
"confinement in an institution severely
diminishes the everyday life activities of
individuals, including family relations,
social contacts, work options, economic
independence, educational advancement
and cultural enrichment."
One of the two plaintiffs lives today in
a three-person group home, and the other
lives in her own apartment, with
supportive services.
Ira Burnim, the legal director of the
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, an
organization here that coordinated
Supreme Court briefs on the women's
behalf, praised the decision. "This is the
first time the Court has announced that
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needless institutionalization is a form of
discrimination," he said in an interview,
adding that the disabilities rights
movement had been working toward this
goal for 30 years.
Copyright C 1999 The New York Times
Company
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RICE v. CAYETANO
"Vote Here. Hawaians ONLY": Special Purpose Elections by Race
Matthew Curtis *
In Rice v. Cayetano, "native Hawaiians" compare themselves to American Indians, and a
native Hawaiian lacking the required ethnicity complains that he is being treated as a second
class citizen. Rice, who was born in Hawaii and whose ancestors were in Hawaii prior to
1893, filed suit against the State of Hawaii when he was denied the opportunity to vote in a
special election for trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. The OIA administers a
public trust fund (derived largely from profits generated by publicly held land) for the benefit
of native Hawaiians. By statutory definition, Rice does not have the required percentage of
"native Hawaiian" blood to be permitted to vote in the election - nor could he have stood
for election as a trustee of the fund. Congress established the public trust fund when it
annexed Hawaii in 1893. Upon attaining statehood in 1959, Congress directed that a portion
of the trust fund would be devoted to "the betterment of the conditions of native
Hawaiians."
In his suit, Rice claims that he has been denied his constitutional rights under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected Rice's claim. Judge Rymer of the Ninth Circuit concluded that the racial
requirement was essentially a legal or political distinction rather than a racial one because it
was rationally related to the purpose of the trust fund. Judge Rymer reasoned that those who
have a stake in the fund should be the ones to whom the trustees of the fund are
responsible. Claiming the issue had not been raised by Rice, Judge Rymer did not address
the question whether the entire program was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments.
Although noting that race was a distinguishing factor in Rice v. Cayetano, Judge Rymer
cited Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). In Salyer, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, upheld a "special purpose" election for management of water
storage districts in which only landowners were permitted to vote. Rehnquist found the
exclusion permissible because the landowners alone had a stake in the election and the
districts lacked "normal governmental authority." Judge Rymer concluded that Salyer was
persuasive and supported the Ninth Circuit's position in Rice.
Judge Rymer downplayed any differences between the status of "native Hawaiians" and
American Indians - "they aren't organized in tribes and there isn't an Hawaiian Commerce
Clause in the Constitution." American Indians have used the special status accorded them
by Congress to obtain various benefits including mineral rights and compensation for the
use of Indian land. Thus, any comparison to American Indians strengthens the "native
Hawaiian's" legal and political positions. However, Judge Rymer overlooked the significant
fact that American Indian tribes were recognized as sovereign by various treaties, while
"native Hawaiians" never entered into a treaty with the government. Therefore, the
Supreme Court will likely reject the comparison. Consequently, if the Court rules against the
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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"native Hawaiians," it seems unlikely that there will be any impact on any Bureau of Indian
Affairs' programs.
However, Rice v. Cayetano may hold greater implications for affirmative action programs
where race is accorded a special status or is the basis of preferential treatment. Rice relied
on the Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), in arguing
that the Ninth Circuit must apply the strict scrutiny test to the OHA election. In Adarand, a
majority of the Court concluded that strict scrutiny must be applied whether the race
classification at issue is "remedial" or "benign." (Strict scrutiny requires a compelling
governmental interest and a narrowly tailored remedy) Thus, Rice v. Cayetano may provide
the Court an opportunity to reinvigorate its holding in Adarand and further limit "remedial"
race-based preferences.
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98-818 Rice v. Cayetano
Ruling below (9th Cir., 146 F.3d 1075):
Neither equal protection clause nor 15th Amendment bars restricting participation in
elections for trustees of Office of Hawaiian Affairs - who administer public trust funds set
aside for betterment of "native Hawaiians" and "Hawaiians," i.e., descendants of aboriginal
people who inhabited Hawaii in 1778 and thereafter - to only those voters who meet blood
quantum requirement for native Hawaiian or Hawaiian, who constitute only group with
stake in trust and funds administered by OHA trustees, who have no general governmental
powers and perform no general governmental functions.
Question presented: Did court of appeals err in holding that 14th and 15th Amendments
permit adoption of explicit racial classification that restricts right to vote in statewide
elections for state officials?
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Harold F. RICE, Appellant
v.
Benjamin J. CAYETANO, Governor of the State of Hawai'i, et al., Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided June 22, 1998
RYMER, Circuit Judge.
Hawaii holds special elections for
trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs
(OHA), who must be Hawaiian and who
administer public trust funds set aside for
the betterment of "native Hawaiians" and
"Hawaiians," in which only people who
meet the blood quantum requirement for
"native Hawaiian" or "Hawaiian" may
vote.' There is a long history behind the
use and structure of the public lands trust
for the benefit of descendants of the
original races inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands, none of which is challenged in
this appeal. Rather, we must decide only
whether Hawaii may limit those who vote
' "Hawaiian" means "any descendant of
the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the
Hawaiian Islands which exercised
sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian
Islands in 1778, and which peoples
thereafter have continued to reside in
Hawaii," and "native Hawaiian" means
"any descendant of not less than one-half
part of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands previous to 1778, as defined by
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act,
1920, as amended; provided that the term
identically refers to the descendants of
such blood quantum of such aboriginal
peoples which exercised sovereignty and
subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778
and which peoples thereafter continued to
reside in Hawaii." Haw.Rev.Stat. § 10-2.
in special trustee elections to those for
whose benefit the trust was established.
Harold F. Rice, who is caucasian and
not a beneficiary of the trusts
administered by OHA's trustees, appeals
the district court's summary judgment in
favor of Benjamin J. Cayetano, Governor
of Hawaii, upholding the voter
qualification in a published opinion.
(footnote ommitted) Rice v. Cayetano, 963
F.Supp. 1547 (D.Haw.1997). We agree
that the franchise for choosing trustees in
special elections may be limited to
Hawaiians, because Hawaiians are the only
group with a stake in the trust and the
funds that OHA trustees administer. They
have the right to vote as such, not just
because they are Hawaiian. For this
reason, neither the Fifteenth Amendment
nor the Equal Protection Clause precludes
Hawaii from restricting the voting for
trustees to Hawaiians and excluding all
others. Therefore, as we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
2 Although neither party addresses
standing, it is a threshold question that we
must consider even if not raised in the
district court or on appeal. FW/PBS, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31
(1990); McMichael v. County ofNapa, 709
F.2d 1268, 1269 (9th Cir.1983). While
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Some history is helpful by way of
background. (footnote ommitted)
Hawaii was an independent kingdom
from 1810 until 1893 when it was
overthrown and replaced by a provisional
government (the Republic of Hawaii) that
sought annexation to the United States.
The United States accepted the cession of
sovereignty of Hawaii in the Annexation
Act of 1898. 30 Stat. 750 (1898). As a
result, roughly 1,800,000 acres of crown,
government, and public lands were ceded
to the United States. The Annexation Act
provided, however, that all revenues from
the public lands were to "be used solely
for the benefit of the inhabitants of the
Hawaiian Islands for educational and
other public purposes." Id. The Organic
Act, passed in 1900, established the
Territory of Hawaii and confirmed that
the public lands ceded to the United
States would remain in the possession of
the government of the Territory for public
works and other public purposes.
Organic Act § 91, 31 Stat. 141 (1900),
reprinted in, 1 Haw.Rev.Stat. at 84 (1993).
In 1920, the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act (HHCA), 42 Stat. 108
(1921), reprinted in, 1 Haw.Rev.Stat. at
Rice may have only a generalized interest
in the affairs of OHA and its trustees, he
appears to be an adequately injured party
as a caucasian resident of Hawaii who
allegedly is denied the right to vote on
racial grounds in a statewide election. See,
e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206-08
(1962) (asserted injury to fundamental
right to vote deemed a sufficient personal
stake to support standing).
191 (1993), set aside some 200,000 acres
of public lands as "available lands" for
nominal price leases to "native
Hawaiians." HHCA § 203. The term
"native Hawaiian" was defined to mean
"any descendent of not less than one-half
part of the blood of the races inhabiting
the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778."
HHCA § 201(7). HHCA responded to
the fact that the number of full-blooded
Hawaiians was decreasing and that the
Hawaiian race required rehabilitation by
being returned to the land. H.R.Rep. No.
839, 66th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 4 (1920).
Accordingly, it specified that the trust was
to be administered on behalf of the native
Hawaiian beneficiaries of the Act. HHCA
( 101(c).
Hawaii was admitted to the union as a
state in 1959. Admission Act of March
18, 1959, Pub.L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4,
reprinted in, 1 Haw.Rev.Stat. at 90 (1993).
In connection with admission, Hawaii
agreed as a compact with the United
States to adopt the HHCA, including its
definition of native Hawaiians, as part of
the state Constitution. Admission Act § 4.
Article XII, § 1 of the Hawaii Constitution
accomplished this. Further, the
Admission Act provided that public lands
held by the United States that were
granted or conveyed to Hawaii pursuant
to § 5(b) were to be held by Hawaii as a
public trust for five purposes, one of
which is "the betterment of the conditions
of native Hawaiians."' Admission Act (
3 Section 5(f) provides that the lands
granted to the State of Hawaii by the
Admission Act, together with proceeds
and income, shall be held by said State as
a public trust for the support of the public
schools and other public educational
institutions, for the betterment of the
conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined
in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act,
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5(f). The other four purposes pertain to
the public generally. (footnote omnitted)
As it happens, no benefits actually
went to native Hawaiians until the state
constitution was amended in 1978 to
establish the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.
OHA was created to hold title to § 5(b)
property (except for HHCA "available
lands," which are separately administered
by the Department of Hawaiian Home
Lands) in trust and manage it for native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians.4 Haw. Const.
art. XII, § 5. OHA administers for native
Hawaiians a pro rata share (now twenty
per cent) of the public lands trust that was
created under § 5(f) of the Admission
Act.' See Haw. Con. art. XII, §5 4, 6;
Haw.Rev.Stat. §§ 10-3(1), 10-13.5. It also
administers appropriated funds for
1920, as amended, for the development of
farm and home ownership on as
widespread a basis as possible for the
making of public improvements, and for
the provision of lands for public use.
Admission Act, § 5(f).
4 The purposes of OIA are the
betterment of conditions of native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians, serving as the
principal agency responsible for the
performance, development, and
coordination of programs for native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians, assessing
policies of other agencies impacting on
native Hawaiians and Hawaiians, and
applying for, receiving, and disbursing
grants for native Hawaiian and Hawaiian
programs and services. Haw.Rev.Stat. §
10-3.
' The other four purposes for the § 5(f)
trust have no allocated pro rata
percentage, nor is the remaining revenue
administered by OHA..
Hawaiians. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 10-3(2).
Pursuant to the constitution and statutes
enacted to implement it, OHA is
governed by a board of trustees whose
members must be Hawaiian and who are
elected in special elections by qualified
voters who are Hawaiian. Haw.Rev.Stat.§§ 13D-1, 13D-2, 13D-3(b)(1), 13D-4.
B
Rice was born and has always lived in
Hawaii. While he traces his ancestry to
two members of the legislature of the
Kingdom of Hawaii, prior to the
Revolution of 1893, Rice is caucasian and
is not within the statutory definition of
Hawaiian or native Hawaiian. See
Haw.Rev.Stat. 5 10-2.
In March 1996, Rice applied to vote in
the August 1996 election for trustees of
OHA. The registration form contained
the following declaration: "I am also
Hawaiian and desire to register to vote in
OHA elections." Rice crossed off the
phrase "am also Hawaiian and" and
marked "yes" on the application. He is
otherwise a qualified voter, but his
application was denied since he is not
Hawaiian.
Rice brought this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his exclusion
from voting for OHA trustees on the
grounds that conditioning eligibility on
being Hawaiian violates the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 as amended (42 U.S.C. 5§
1971 et seq.), (footnote ominitted) 42
U.S.C. § 1981, and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. The district court
concluded that the method of electing
OHA trustees meets constitutional
standards for the essential reason that the
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restriction on the right to vote is not
based upon race, but upon a recognition
of the unique status of native Hawaiians
that bears a rational connection to
Hawaii's trust obligations. In any event,
the court noted, OHA performs no truly
governmental functions and "is carefully
constrained by its overall purpose to work
for the betterment of Hawaiians." 963
F.Supp. at 1558. Having already disposed
of other claims, the court entered
summary judgment. Rice timely appealed.
II
Rice complains about the
"extraordinary" authority and discretion
that OHA, which is a state agency, is
given to provide government services to a
segment of the population defined
exclusively by race, funded by a twenty
percent share of revenues from the public
lands trust which may lawfully be applied
for the benefit of all people of the state
without regard to race, and run by trustees
who are voted into office by an electorate
apportioned on a purely racial basis. He
submits that the racial restriction on the
right to vote violates the Fifteenth
Amendment because it conditions the
right to vote in statewide elections for
trustees on membership in the Hawaiian
race. It violates the Fourteenth
Amendment, according to Rice, because
this classification by race, and the
corresponding racial restriction on the
franchise, fails the test of strict scrutiny
which must be applied to all distinctions
based on race under Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). ***
Hawaii, on the other hand,
emphasizes that neither the definition of
native Hawaiians or Hawaiians, nor the
designation of specific public lands for
their benefit, nor OHA, nor its purposes,
is at issue. That being so, it contends, the
limitation of the right to vote for OHA
trustees to Hawaiians and native
Hawaiians is not a racial classification, but
a legal one based on who are beneficiaries
of the trusts in a special purpose,
disproportionate impact election of the
sort described in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973). In any event, Hawaii points out, it
did not intentionally discriminate on the
basis of race because the genesis of the
whole structure was Congress's
requirement that the new state of Hawaii
accept the definition of native Hawaiian in
the HHCA and accede to the purposes of
the § 5(f) trust which include, in part,
betterment of the conditions of native
Hawaiians. Finally, the state submits, its
classification survives rational basis review
(which is the appropriate standard) under
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974),
because the federal government and the
state of Hawaii have the same special
relationship with and owe the same
unique obligation to native Hawaiians as
the federal government does to Indian
tribes.
Rice counters Hawaii's argument that
the right to vote merely reflects the legal
status of native Hawaiians and Hawaiians
by pointing out that the legal status of
being a beneficiary of the OHA trusts is
based only on race. That may be so, but
the constitutionality of the racial
classification that underlies the trusts and
OHA is not challenged in this case.' This
6 In this connection, we note that the
scholarly work upon which Rice
relies--and others that we have
read--focuses on the underlying
arrangement and its constitutionality, not
on the voting rights provision at issue
here. See Stuart M. Benjamin, Equal
Protection and the Special Relationship,
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means that we must accept the trusts and
their administrative structure as we find
them, and assume that both are lawful.7
If, as we must, we take it as given that
lands were properly set aside in trust for
native Hawaiians; that the State properly
established an Office of Hawaiian Affairs
to hold title to, and manage, property set
aside in trust or appropriated exclusively
for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians; and
that OHLA is properly governed by a
board of trustees whose members are
Hawaiian, it follows that the state may
rationally conclude that Hawaiians, being
the group to whom trust obligations run
and to whom OHA trustees owe a duty of
loyalty, (footnote ommitted) should be the
group to decide who the trustees ought to
be. Put another way, the voting
restriction is not primarily racial, but legal
or political. Thus, we conclude that Rice's
argument fails under both the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments for essentially
the same reasons.
106 Yale L.J. 537 (1996); see also Jon Van
Dyke, The Constitutionality of the Office
of Hawaiian Affairs, 7 U. Haw. L.Rev. 63
(1985).
7 We express no opinion on the
constitutionality of the underlying trust
structure, or of OHA's purposes, because
we are not called upon to determine the
constitutionality of any of the racial
classifications in the HHCA or the
Admission Act or the Hawaii Constitution
or the statutes establishing OHA--except
for the one provision in Article XII,
Section 5 of the Constitution and
Haw.Rev.Stat. § 13D-3, limiting the right
to vote for OHA trustees, that are directly
challenged here.
A
Specifically with respect to the
Fifteenth Amendment, (footnote
ommitted) Rice maintains that Hawaii has
created a racially pure voting bloc which
states cannot do for any reason under
Gomillion v. Ljhfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Moreover, he points out, the Fifteenth
Amendment is self-executing and absolute
on its face. Since the voter qualification is
expressly racial, and absolutely denies the
right to vote to all races except the
Hawaiian race, Rice contends that it
violates the plain meaning of the Fifteenth
Amendment without need for further
inquiry. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Rice is, of course, quite right that the
Hawaii Constitution and Haw.Rev.Stat.
13D-3 contain a racial classification on
their face. The Hawaii Constitution
provides in Article XII, section 5: "There
shall be a board of trustees for the Office
of Hawaiian Affairs elected by qualified
voters who are Hawaiians, as provided by
law." And § 13D-3, implementing it,
provides that: "No person shall be
eligible to register as a voter for the
election of board members unless the
person meets the following qualifications:
(1) The person is Hawaiian."
Haw.Rev.Stat. § 13D-3(b).
Yet restricting voter eligibility to
Hawaiians cannot be understood without
reference to what the vote is for. As the
district court explained in detail, 963
F.Supp. at 1556-57, the vote is for the
limited purpose of electing trustees who
have no general governmental powers and
perform no general governmental
purposes.' The voting restriction itself
8 OHA trustees have power to manage
proceeds and income from whatever
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applies only at a special election to elect
members of the OHA board; (footnote
ommitted) in general elections, all persons
generally qualified to vote may vote. In
these respects the trustee elections are like
the special purpose elections upheld in
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410
U.S. 719 (1973) and Ball v. James, 451 U.S.
355 (1981). In both cases, the system for
electing directors of special purpose water
districts limited voting eligibility to
landowners on a proportional basis,
excluding others in the district. The
Court concluded that by virtue of their
limited purpose, including the districts'
lack of normal governmental authority,
and the disproportionate effect of their
activities on landowners as a group, the
source for native Hawaiians and
Hawaiians, including § 5(f) revenue; to
exercise control over property set aside to
OHA for native Hawaiians and
Hawaiians; to handle money and property
on behalf of OHA; to formulate policy
relating to the affairs of native Hawaiians
and Hawaiians; to provide grants for pilot
projects; and to make available technical
and financial assistance and advisory
services for native Hawaiian and Hawaiian
programs. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 10-5. The
duties of the board are similarly
channeled. They are to develop a master
plan for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians;
to assist in development of other agencies'
plans for native Hawaiian and Hawaiian
programs and services; to maintain an
inventory of, and act as clearinghouse for,
programs for native Hawaiians and
Hawaiians; to keep other agencies
informed about native Hawaiian and
Hawaiian programs; and to conduct
research, develop models for programs,
apply for and administer federal funds and
promote the establishment of agencies to
serve native Hawaiians and Hawaiians.
Haw.Rev.Stat. § 10-6.
districts' electoral scheme comported with
the Fourteenth Amendment and did not
run afoul of the popular election
requirements set out in Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964). Thus, elections may
be held for special purposes and voter
qualifications that might otherwise be
invalid may survive when they limit
eligible voters to those who are
disproportionately affected and the
government agency does not perform
fundamentally governmental functions.
Rice nevertheless asks us to dismiss
the Salyer rationale entirely on account of
OHA's authority over funds that include a
twenty percent share of revenues from the
ceded lands trust; the similarity between
what OHA does for its beneficiaries and
what the state otherwise does generally for
all citizens without regard to race; and the
fact that OHA activities are of vital
concern to all citizens of Hawaii. But we
cannot set Salyer aside altogether, for
Rice's points reflect frustration with
OHA--which is something we can do
nothing about in this case. Whether or
not the frustration--or OHA--is justified,
the fact remains that public lands and
funds have long since been committed in
trust, and continue to be allocated in part,
for the purpose of benefiting the
Hawaiian peoples; they are the only
peoples legally interested in how those
funds are handled; and for them to decide
who should administer the trust does not
seem exceptionable under Salyer except
for the fact, which we recognize, that the
qualification has to do with race instead of
ownership of land, as in Salyer. For this
reason we do not regard Salyer as
dispositive, but we cannot say that it has
no applicability whatever.
Nor may we ignore the reality that the
voting restriction for trustees is rooted in
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historical concern for the Hawaiian race,
going back at least to the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act of 1920, carried
through statehood when Hawaii
acknowledged a trust obligation toward
native Hawaiians as a condition of
admission to the union, and on to 1993,
when Congress passed a Joint Resolution
"apologiz[ing] to Native Hawaiians on
behalf of the people of the United States
for the overthrow of the Kingdom of
Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the
participation of agents and citizens of the
United States, and the deprivation of the
rights of Native Hawaiians to
self-determination." Pub.L. 103-150, 107
Stat. 1510 (1993). In this sense, the
special treatment of Hawaiians and native
Hawaiians reflected in establishment of
trusts for their benefit, and the creation of
OHA to administer them, is similar to the
special treatment of Indians that the
Supreme Court approved in Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). As we said
of Mancari in Alaska Chapter, Associated
Gen. Contractors v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162
(9th Cir.1982), preferential treatment that
is grounded in the government's unique
obligation toward Indians is a political
rather than a racial classification, even
though racial criteria may be used in
defining eligibility. Id. at 1168 n. 10.
While we recognize that Mancariis
distinguishable because Hawaiians are not
exactly like Indians (for example, they
aren't organized in tribes and there isn't
an Hawaiian Commerce Clause in the
Constitution), (footnote ommitted) and
we do not regard either Mancari or Pierce as
controlling,' both indicate that we are not
9 Although we questioned Mancarz's
continuing vitality in light of Adarand in
Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 663 (9th
Cir.1997), and Rice believes Adarand
trumps both, we are bound by Supreme
Court authority and our own precedent
compelled to invalidate the voting
restriction simply because it appears to be
race-based without also considering the
unique trust relationship that gave rise to
it.
Accordingly, even though there is little
authority to guide application of the
Fifteenth Amendment in a case such as
this, we are persuaded that no violation
exists. The Fifteenth Amendment
"squarely prohibits racially-based denials
of the right to vote," Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law, at 335 n. 2
(2d ed.1988), and renders inoperative any
provision of a state constitution that
restricts the right to suffrage to members
of a particular race, see Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370, 389 (1881), but this isn't a
general election for government officials
performing government functions of the
sort that has previously triggered Fifteenth
Amendment analysis. Further, the voter
qualification at issue here-- albeit clearly
racial on its face--does not exclude those
who ever had, now have, or ever can have
any interest in the outcome of the special
election for trustees (at least not unless
and until the whole trust scheme and
administrative structure is invalidated).
Under these circumstances, to permit only
Hawaiians to vote in special elections for
trustees of a trust that we must presume
was lawfully established for their benefit
does not deny non- Hawaiians the right to
vote in any meaningful sense. The special
election for trustees is not equivalent to a
general election, and the vote is not for
officials who will perform general
governmental functions in either a
representative or executive capacity. Cf,
e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)
(striking down, under the Fifteenth
until overruled, which neither Mancari nor
Pierce has been.
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Amendment, procedural hurdles to
registering to vote in general elections);
Smith v. Allnght, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(state cannot set racial qualifications for
primary because the right to vote in a
primary is like the right to vote in a
general election). Nor does the limitation
in these circumstances suggest that voting
eligibility was designed to exclude persons
who would otherwise be interested in
OHA's affairs. Cf, e.g., Gomillion v.
Lghfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (gerrymandering
city boundary to deny a vote to
African-Americans who lived in the city
and otherwise would have had the right to
vote in municipal elections, without any
countervailing municipal function the
scheme was designed to further). Rather,
it reflects the fact that the trustees'
fiduciary responsibilities run only to native
Hawaiians and Hawaiians and "a board of
trustees chosen from among those who
are interested parties would be the best
way to insure proper management and
adherence to the needed fiduciary
principles." (footnote ommitted) The
challenged part of Hawaii law was not
contrived to keep non-Hawaiians from
voting in general, or in any respect
pertinent to their legal interests.
Therefore, we cannot say that Rice's right
to vote has been denied or abridged in
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
B
Regardless, Rice argues, the racial
restriction on the right to vote for OIA
trustees violates the Fourteenth
Amendment (footnote ommitted) even if
the Fifteenth Amendment isn't applicable.
Shaw indicates that racial classifications
on the face of a statute are immediately
suspect, he emphasizes, and the
classification here cannot survive for lack
of any compelling justification under
Adarand.
We obviously agree that there is a
racial classification on the face of 5
13D-3, and that it is suspect as such; but
we disagree for the reasons we have
already explained that it is primarily racial
in context. Nor is the eligibility
requirement, strictly speaking, a
preference of the sort that concerned the
Court in Adarand. Instead, it is more like
the limitation of voting to landowners in
Salyer. We have no trouble understanding
why Hawaii would want the people who
have an interest in the trust to vote for
trustees, and it is rational for the state to
make this decision in light of its trust
responsibilities for Hawaiians and native
Hawaiians. See Mancan, 417 U.S. 535;
Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162. However, even if
the voting restriction must be subjected to
strict judicial scrutiny because the
classification is based explicitly on race, it
survives because the restriction is rooted
in the special trust relationship between
Hawaii and descendants of aboriginal
peoples who subsisted in the Islands in
1778 and still live there--which is not
challenged in this appeal. Thus, the
scheme for electing trustees ultimately
responds to the state's compelling
responsibility to honor the trust, and the
restriction on voter eligibility is precisely
tailored to the perceived value that a
board "chosen from among those who are
interested parties would be the best way to
insure proper management and adherence
to the needed fiduciary principles." 1
Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of Hawaii of 1978, Standing
Comm. Rep. No. 59 at 644.
Given the fact that only Hawaiians
and native Hawaiians are trust
beneficiaries, there is no race-neutral way
to accord only those who have a legal
interest in management of trust assets a
say in electing trustees except to do so
according to the statutory definition by
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blood quantum which makes the
beneficiaries the same as the voters. We
therefore conclude that because
Hawaiians and native Hawaiians have the
right to vote as such, not just because they
are Hawaiian, that the Equal Protection
Clause does not preclude Hawaii from
restricting the voting for trustees to
Hawaiians and excluding all others.
AFFIRMED.
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SUPREME COURT ROUNDUP
Justices to Weigh Race Banier in Hawaiian Voting
The New York Times
Tuesday, March 23, 1999
Linda Greenhouse
In a case that mixes history, race and
evolving constitutional doctrine, the
Supreme Court agreed today to decide
whether Hawaii may continue to deny
anyone who is not descended from the
original Hawaiians the right to vote for
the leadership of an agency that
administers tens of millions of dollars in
public money.
The agency is the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs, set up under the state's
Constitution in 1978 to oversee trust
funds, for which most revenue comes
from former royal Hawaiian lands. The
office's nine trustees, who must
themselves be descendants of the native
Hawaiians, are charged with spending the
money on education, social welfare and
other programs to benefit native
Hawaiians.
Harold F. Rice is a native Hawaiian,
in the sense that he was born in the
islands to which his great-great-
grandparents moved in the 19th century.
But this is not what the state Constitution
means by Hawaiian, a term that signifies
not place of birth but race.
When Mr. Rice, a Cornell-educated
rancher and polo player from the town of
Kamuela, in a remote corner of Hawaii's
Big Island, went to vote three years ago in
the statewide election for Office of
Hawaiian Affairs trustees, he was turned
away.
He sued the state under the 15th
Amendment, one of the amendments
adopted after the Civil War to guarantee
that the freed slaves would have the right
to vote. It provides: "The right of citizens
of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."
He lost in both the Federal District
Court in Honolulu and m the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in San Francisco, where a panel of
three judges wrote last June that the racial
voting restriction was "rooted in historical
concern for the Hawaiian race" and
justified "because Hawaiians are the only
group with a stake in the trust" and in the
money that the trustees administer.
That explanation did not satisfy Mr.
Rice, and the question now is whether it
will satisfy the Supreme Court. Theodore
B. Olson, a well-connected Washington
lawyer recruited for the Supreme Court
appeal by Mr. Rice's lawyer in Kamuela,
John W. Goemans, told the Justices that
the appeals court's decision ratified "a
broad and patently offensive regime of
racially segregated voting in the state of
Hawaii."
Clearly, the case, Rice v. Cayetano,
No. 98-818, got the Court's attention,
provoking an unusually prolonged debate
among the Justices over whether to hear
the appeal.
Before today's announcement, the
case had been under active consideration
at the Justices' weekly, closed-door
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conferences since the beginning of the
year, suggesting that it was subject to a
degree of vetting far greater than the
typical case at this early stage, where the
question is not how to decide a case but
whether to hear it at all. The case will be
argued in October.
If the Justices perceive this case as
something of a hot potato, that is
understandable. While no other state
program resembles Hawaii's, the case
raises far broader questions about making
race a condition of eligibility for public
benefits.
While it is certainly possible to
structure a narrow decision specific to
Hawaii, as the Ninth Circuit did, it is also
possible to turn this case into a
battleground of the ongoing affirmative
action wars. A series of recent Supreme
Court opinions have subjected
government programs that offer special
benefits on the basis of race to the same
rigorous constitutional scrutiny, no matter
which race is the beneficiary.
Another interesting element in the
case is a 1973 Supreme Court opinion on
which the appeals court based a
substantial part of its analysis. That case,
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake District,
upheld a California law that gave land
owners, and no one else, the right to vote
for the management of water storage
districts.
These were "special purpose"
elections in which property owners had by
far the greatest stake, then-Associate
Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote for
the majority. Three liberal Justices,
William 0. Douglas, William J. Brennan
Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, vigorously
dissented, on the ground that renters,
sharecroppers and other nonowners could
be injured by mismanagement of the
water supply, and "all should have a say."
There were also these other
developments today as the Court returned
from a two-week recess.
Professors' Workload
The Court upheld an Ohio law that
both required state universities to set
standards for the amount of time
professors should devote to classroom
teaching and took the question of
professors' workload off the table as a
subject for collective bargaining.
The 8-to-1 decision overturned a
ruling by the Ohio Supreme Court, which
held that the 1993 state law violated the
professors' constitutional right to equal
protection because no other public
employees were barred from negotiating
with the state over their workload. Ohio
appealed the ruling.
The Court's unsigned opinion today,
from which only Justice John Paul Stevens
dissented, said the state law was a
straightforward economic regulation that
was constitutional as long as it had a
rational basis. The state's goal was "to
increase the time spent by faculty in the
classroom," the opinion said, adding that
the law "was an entirely rational step to
accomplish this objective."
Justice Stevens objected that the
Court should not have issued a decision
without full briefing and argument. The
Justices had never formally granted review
in the case, Central State University v.
American Association of University
Professors, No. 98-1071. Justice Stevens
said that while he had not reached a
conclusion, the Court's analysis was
"mechanistic" and ignored the issues of
academic freedom that were present in the
case.
Justice Stevens also added a sly
observation. "While surveying the flood
of law reviews that cross my desk," he
said, "I have sometimes wondered
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whether law professors have any time to
spend teaching their students about the
law."
A majority of Ohio's legislators
evidently had "a similar reaction," he
added.
Violence Against Women
Without comment, the Court turned
down a constitutional challenge to a
provision of a Federal law, the Violence
Against Women Act, that makes it a
Federal crime to cross state lines for the
purpose of injuring a "spouse or intimate
partner."
The appeal was brought by the first
woman to be convicted under the 1994
law, a Russian immigrant who was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison
for conspiring in the murder of her
estranged husband, Yakov Gluzman. Mr.
Gluzman, also an immigrant from Russia,
was a successful medical researcher when
his wife, Rita Gluzman, and a cousin
traveled from New Jersey to New York to
kill him in his apartment in Pearl River.
Mrs. Gluzman's appeal, Gluzman v.
United States, No. 98-1326, argued that
Congress lacked constitutional authority
to turn a crime of domestic violence into a
Federal offense. The lower Federal courts
had rejected that challenge.
The Justices are likely to have another
chance to consider the issue. Earlier this
month, the Federal appeals court in
Richmond declared another provision of
the Violence Against Women Act
unconstitutional, and a Supreme Court
appeal is planned in that case, Brzonkala
v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
Prosecutor's Comment
The Court accepted an appeal by New
York State from a ruling that a Queens
prosecutor violated a defendant's
constitutional rights by telling the jury that
the defendant had derived a "big
advantage" from sitting through the
testimony of witnesses at his rape trial.
The implication of the comment was that
the defendant, Ray Agard, had thus been
able to tailor his own testimony to what
had gone before.
The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit had granted Mr.
Agard's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the comment
in effect had compromised his right to
attend his own trial. In its appeal,
Portuondo v. Agard, No. 98-1170, the
state asked the Justices to resolve what it
said was widespread confusion over the
propriety of prosecutors' comments on
defendants' conduct or demeanor in the
courtroom.
Sibling Adoption
Without comment, the Court turned
down an appeal filed on behalf of a 4-
year-old foster child who was separated
from his 6-year-old sister for eventual
adoption by an aunt. The children's
parents had been found unfit, and a
Massachusetts court approved a request
by an aunt in New Jersey to rear him. The
appeal, Hugo P_ v. George P., No. 98-
7565, argued that the custody order
separating the siblings violated the boy's
constitutional right to "family integrity."
Copyright C 1999 The New York Times
Company
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WHEN RACE DETERMINES WHO GETS TO VOTE
The Christian Science Monitor
Tuesday, April 6, 1999
Alex Salkever, Special to The Christian Science Monitor
To native Hawaiians, the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs is a crucial part of the
state's effort to right past wrongs. To at
least one of Hawaii's other residents, it's
creating new ones.
The Office of Hawaiian Affairs
(OHA) manages more than $ 300 million
of public money and administers a variety
of social programs. But its trustees are
elected in a vote open only to native
Hawaiians.
Sixth-generation Hawaii resident
Harold Rice says this practice is
discriminatory and unconstitutional, so
he's suing the state. After years of appeals,
the United States Supreme Court recently
agreed to hear the case.
If it sides with the disgruntled Big
Island rancher when it takes up the case
later this year, the ruling could have a
profound impact on the rights of native
groups both here and on the mainland.
"If the court reverses, it could raise
fundamental questions about the ability of
any native group to govern itself," says
Jon Van Dyke, a University of Hawaii law
professor who has represented OHA on
the case.
For native Hawaiians, the case is a
crucial step in their long road toward
sovereignty. Their status with the federal
government has been vague for decades.
Unlike other indigenous groups in the
US, native Hawaiians have never had a
claims court to address their grievances,
and special provisions to set up
reservations or include Hawaiians in
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) social
programs were never made.
In addition, Hawaiians never entered
into any treaties with the federal
government - a legal platform that Indian
groups have used to gain compensation or
access to natural resources.
Many native Hawaiians say this case
will help them redress some of these
inequalities. "The No. 1 issue with this
lawsuit is whether or not Hawaiians are
considered to have political status," says
OHA trustee Clayton Hee. If the court
sides with OHA, "the next logical step is
for the Hawaiians ... to establish their
sovereign rights before the US Congress.
Every facet that is enjoyed by other native
peoples should be enjoyed by Hawaiians."
Such logic is only fair, OHA
supporters add, because native Hawaiians
- who make up as much as 20 percent of
the state's population - share many of the
same troubles as their mainland
indigenous counterparts. High rates of
poverty, mortality, drug abuse, and
imprisonment make them the most
troubled ethnic group in Hawaii.
OHA was set up in 1978 to help
alleviate some of these problems. It was
also intended to return some of the power
stripped from native Hawaiians when the
Kingdom of Hawaii was overthrown by a
US-backed group of white merchants and
missionaries in 1893.
During the past two decades, millions
of dollars have poured into OHA coffers
from the state general fund and from
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revenues on "ceded lands," lands held in
trust by the state for the benefit native
Hawaiians and the general public. Under
state law, native Hawaiians are entitled to
20 percent of the revenues. Negotiations
are currently under way to determine the
extent of additional state obligations to
OHA, which could range as high as $ 1
billion.
OHA'S access to this money is what
has upset Mr. Rice. If OHA can spend
state money, then everyone in the state
should have a say in how it's spent, he
says.
"Mr. Rice contends that he was denied
the right to vote in an election held by the
State of Hawaii to elect individuals who
would make decisions concerning public
resources in Hawaii, and he was denied
the right to vote based on his race or
national origin," says Theodore Olson,
Rice's attorney. "The courts never said
that the people who moved into Utah and
settled Utah can deny equal rights and
privileges to people who moved in
afterwards."
Rice's attorney asserts that, unlike
Indian tribes, native Hawaiians are not
sovereign political entities, but ancestral
residents. Thus, OHA elections that
exclude Hawaii residents violate the 14th
and 15th Amendments, which promise
equal protection under the law and the
right to vote regardless of race.
But the state and the native Hawaiians
note that a 1974 United States Supreme
Court ruling allows the BIA to give hiring
preferences to native Americans because
the BIA's job is to serve and improve the
status of native Americans.
"Because the native people have their
own resources and their own trust assets,
they should be allowed to govern these
assets themselves," says Professor Van
Dyke.
The fact is, though, the Supreme
Court has consistently ruled against
indigenous groups during the 1990s.
Justices Clarence Thomas and
Antonin Scalia are opponents of
preferential treatment of virtually any
type. And with the pendulum swinging
against affirmative-action programs, there
is a chance that the Supreme Court could
revise its 1974 ruling, upending the legal
bulwarks that have been used to build
programs for native Americans.
Copyright C 1999 The Christian Science
Publishing Society
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AN AMERICAN RACE LAW
The New York Post
Tuesday, May 25,1999
Michael Meyers
IS Hawaii still part of the United
States, or some outpost where non-
"indigenous" people are second-class
citizens?
The case is headed to the U.S.
Supreme Court. It centers on Harold Rice,
a Hawaiian who went to vote in a
statewide election - and was turned away.
A state law (and a 1978 amendment to the
state's Constitution) disqualified him from
voting because, as a white man, he is not a
"native Hawaiian."
No matter that Rice is Hawaiian,
whose ancestors served in the Hawaiian
Legislature before annexation. Because his
blood is not 50 percent "Hawaiian," the
law deems him not to be a red-blooded
native and therefore he's ineligible to vote
in a statewide, government-administered
election over a matter that involves a trust
for the benefit of "real" Hawaiians.
Blood tests for voting? There's more
to this outrage. Any Hawaiian - white,
black, yellow, brown - who can't trace his
or her roots to the land before 1778
(when "Westerner'' Captain Cook arrived
in the islands) is, well, unauthentic. Only
sufficiently-blooded Hawaiians may vote
for the trustees of the state Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, all of whom must be
"Hawaiian" as well.
For the benefit of the indigenous
population, the office administers lands
ceded back to Hawaii and the funds
derived therefrom. (It also disburses
monies from the state's general coffers.)
These reparations, say the politically
correct in Hawaii, are due to the people
whose land (then under the control of a
monarchy) the United States stole.
The twist is in how a federal district
court and an appeals court managed to
uphold this race test: They decided that
the category "Hawaiian" was not a racial
classification at all but a political
classification: Hawaii, the courts claim, is
treating native Hawaiians like American
Indian tribes (who do have special
constitutional protection).
No federal law, and nothing in the
U.S. Constitution, designates native
Hawaiians as Indians. The judges just
made it up. In so doing, they've
functionally repealed (for that statewide
election) the 14th and 15th Amendments,
which are plain and unequivocal in
guaranteeing every American citizen the
equal protection of the laws and the right
not to be discriminated against in voting
on the grounds of their race."
Last Saturday, the Executive Board of
the American Civil Liberties Union chose
not to file a brief on the side of the
"native Hawaiians." That decision was
achieved by the ACLU's savvy and
politically courageous president, Nadine
Strossen. But the motion failed on a tie
vote - signaling the power of bad law and
confused thinking about race in this
showdown.
By imposing a racial test in the name
of protecting the interests of native
Hawaiians, Hawaii exposes a contempt for
American-style constitutional rights and
"Western" thinking that borders on
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official racial separatism and secessionist
fever.
History divides. Yes, lands were stolen
from natives, just as other peoples were
stolen from their native land. But we're all
here now, together, for better and worse,
enjoying the blessings of freedom and
equality as we have decreed it in our
federal Constitution.
Harold Rice is one American who
won't let race divide his state and our
nation. If Hawaiians are lucky, our
Supreme Court will strike down their
racial voting scheme, and give Mr. Rice
back his standing and heritage as a full-
blooded Hawaiian and American citizen.
Copyright C 1999 N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc.
All rights reserved.
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RESURGENT RACISM IN HAWAII?
The Washington Times
Tuesday, March 30, 1999
Bruce Fein
Chief Justice of the United States
Harlan Fiske Stone sermonized in
Hirabiyashi vs. United States (1943) that,
"distinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very
nature odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality." It is a sermon too readily
forgotten, even with the graphic reminder
of Kosovo and a burgeoning of other
ethnic conflicts fueled by generations of
discrimination.
The case of Rice vs. Cayetano,
pending in the United States Supreme
Court, is worrisome on that score.
Underlying the dispute is Hawaii's
dedication of public largesse on "native
Hawaiians" and "Hawaiians" to the
exclusion of its other citizens.
Reminiscent of Nazi Germany's
Nuremburg laws, Hawaiian is defined as
"any descendent of the aboriginal peoples
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands which
exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the
Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which
peoples thereafter have continued to
reside in Hawaii." Native Hawaiians are
defined as "any descendent of not less
than one-half part of the races inhabiting
the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778...."
The Republic of Hawaii sought
annexation to the United States, which
accepted the overture in the Annexation
Act of 1898. It provided that revenues
from 1.8 million acres of land ceded to the
United States would be devoted solely to
educational and other public purposes on
behalf of all Hawaiian Island residents.
The Organic Act of 1900 transferred the
lands to the territorial government of
Hawaii for public works and for other
public purposes.
In 1920, however, racism crept into
the law with the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act. It set aside 200,000
acres of public lands for leasing at
nominal rents to "any descendent of not
less than one-half part of the blood of
races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands
previous to 1778." Its inspiration was a
plunging number of full-blooded
Hawaiians and a racially stereotypical
belief that the Hawaiian race needed
rehabilitation by a return to the land.
Hawaiian statehood arrived with the
1959 Admission Act. It stipulated that
public lands held by the United States
conveyed to Hawaii pursuant to section
5(b) were to be held in trust for fivefold
purposes, including "the betterment of
conditions of native Hawaiians." In 1978,
Hawaii established the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs to hold 20 percent of section 5(b)
property in trust for native Hawaiians and
Hawaiians. Caucasians who pay taxes and
otherwise assume the burdens of
citizenship need not apply. OHA is
governed by a board of trustees whose
members must be Hawaiian and who are
elected solely by Hawaiian voters.
Caucasians are blacklisted because of the
happenstance of ancestry.
It would seem that the OHA and its
race-based beneficiaries flagrantly violate
Chief Justice Stone's teaching that
government distinctions that pivot on
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ancestry are odious to a free people. They
are instantly suspect under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. The exaltation of
Hawaiians and native Hawaiians by the
OHA might be justified if calculated to
overcome past discrimination, but no
such findings have been made either by
Congress, Hawaii or any court. It is
racism for the sake of racism political
correctness inclined to glorify aboriginal
peoples and aboriginal life at work.
Harold F. Rice, a caucasian excluded
from voting for the OHA board,
challenged the constitutionality of
Hawaii's race-based voting register. The
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits racial
discrimination in the franchise, and the
Fourteenth Amendment enjoins the same
result by dint of its equal protection
clause. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however,
rebuffed Mr. Rice's attack. Writing for a
panel of three, Judge Pamela Ann Rhymer
insisted that since the OHA board
dedicated public resources only to
Hawaiian and native Hawaiian
beneficiaries, there was nothing wayward
about excluding all others from voting for
its members. According to Judge Rhymer,
caucasians hold no interest in how public
funds are employed for the betterment of
Hawaiians and native Hawaiians.
Moreover, the jurist maintained, the
United States apologized in 1993 for the
participation of its citizens and agents in
the overthrow of the non-democratic
Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893, five years
before it was annexed.
Both reasons are wrongheaded.
Caucasian citizens of Hawaii may be
intensely concerned with the operations of
the OHA, for instance, whether it
promotes assimilation or separate
identities for Hawaiians or native
Hawaiians through housing, education or
cultural events. They might be rightly
concerned, like Ben Franklin, that if we do
not all hang together, then assuredly we
will all hang separately. Similarly, childless
citizens are entitled to vote in school
board elections without discrimination
because the future of the nation rests on
the education of its youth.
Finally, to anchor Hawaii's racial
discrimination on a perceived historical
injustice in 1893 would be like Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic justifying
Serb discrimination against Kosovars
because of the Serb's misfortune at the
hands of the Ottoman Turks in the 1389
Battle of Kosovo. Walking even an inch
down that road of historical grievances is
miles too far, and the United States
Supreme Court should loudly say so.
Bruce Fein is a lawyer and free-lance
writer specializing in legal issues.
Copyright C 1999 News World
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